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This paper reviews and evaluates the concept of power in management and 
organization science. In order to organize the extant literature on this topic, we 
develop a framework that identifies four faces of power (i.e., coercion, manipulation, 
domination and subjectification) and four sites of power (i.e., power enacted ‘in’, 
‘through’, ‘over’ and ‘against’ organizations). This allows us to evaluate assumptions 
both shared and contested in the field. Building on the review, the paper then points to 
potentially novel areas of research that may extend our understandings of 





Organizations must be seen as tools … A tool is something you can get something done with. 
It is a resource if you control it. It gives you power others do not have. Organizations are 
multipurpose tools for shaping the world as one wishes it to be shaped. They provide the 
means for imposing one’s definition of the proper affairs of men [sic] upon other men 
(Perrow, 1972: 14). 
 
Never have organizations been under such political scrutiny as they are today. 
Large corporations routinely wade into political debates with attempts to shape public 
policy. Activists increasingly target specific organizations rather than governments. 
Concerned community groups lobby the state to curb the power of large enterprises. 
Public struggles for power over firms and community enterprises are often reported. 
Social movements have shifted from the status of fringe actors to central shapers of 
organization life, even contesting the very existence of enterprises that were once 
considered normal and indispensable to society (Davis et al, 2005). And organizations 
themselves are rife with day-to-day political bustle, characterized by powerful actors 
either revered or despised, groups vying for influence and subordinates contesting 
decisions. Rather than being an aberration, it seems that power is an endemic part of 
organizational life. As Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips (2006: 3) poetically put it in 
relation to the key topic of this paper: “power is to organization as oxygen is to 
breathing”.  
But this observation also means that now more than ever we require rigorous 
and robust conceptualizations of how organizational power functions. Moreover, and 
as the opening quote by Charles Perrow (1972) points out, a ‘political view’ 
necessitates sound conceptualizations of the power that is used to shape, manage and 
change large organizations today. The purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate 
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the conceptualizations of power in management and organization studies in order to 
provide fresh avenues for future research.   
The social sciences often conflate power and ‘politics’ in and around 
organizations. So it is important to make an analytical distinction between the two 
concepts. For example, Max Weber defined power as “the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his [sic] will despite 
resistance” (Weber, 1978: 53). As such, many have gone on to define politics as the 
tactics and strategies actors use to articulate this power or attempt to resist it, 
especially when goals and interests in the organization are conflicted. This is why 
organizational politics is still often understood to be nasty ‘backstabbing’ types of 
behavior, involving backroom deals and the irrational influence over others.   
The above differentiation is not without its difficulties, of course. For 
example, Weber’s definition of power tends to understand it as something individuals 
hold. This has inspired some classic approaches to the topic, in particular French and 
Raven’s (1968) bases of power perceptive (which includes coercive, reward, 
legitimate, referent and expert modalities of power). Other research has correctly 
highlighted the relational nature of power, shifting the focus to structural relations 
rather than actor attributes. For example, Hickson, Hinings, Lee and Schneck (1971) 
found that individual departments are not powerful in themselves but become so only 
when they create relational dependencies. The establishment and maintenance of such 
dependencies are the basis of inter/intra-organizational power and politics (also see 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). In addition, Foucauldian approaches too have suggested 
that power resides between individuals, actors and organizations rather than being 
seated within any given member (Clegg, 1990; Sewell, 1998).  
For the purposes of this paper, we will broadly mark out the conceptual terrain 
by following Hannah Arendt’s (1958; 1970) observation that politics consists of 
activity that rearranges relations between people and the distribution of goods 
(broadly defined) through the mobilization of power. In turn, power is the capacity to 
influence other actors with these political interests in mind. It is a resource to get 
things done through other people, to achieve certain goals that may be shared or 
contested. This understanding of organizational power will be the central concern of 
this paper.   
If researchers sometimes conflate power and politics, there is also a converse 
trend in management science of omitting the political dimension from the concept of 
power. Consequently, power is deemed a functional resource and politics a messy 
irrationality in organizational life. In classical organization theory, for example, 
ordered social action was seen as the opposite of political activity (Perrow, 1972). 
Organizations were understood to be rational systems geared towards the achievement 
of specific ends. Politics, on the other hand, was thought to involve debate and 
deliberation around what those ends might be. To move an issue from a political one 
to an organizational one was seen as a process of ‘de-politicization’ (Wolin, 2005). 
When politics did raise its ugly head in organizational life it was often considered a 
nuisance to everyday business – something to be kept to a bare minimum and 
contained.  
This classic dichotomy between rational organizations and politics was called 
into question by a strand of literature which began to observe that organizations not 
only de-politicized social life. Rather, political dynamics are definitive of most power 
relations in organizations (Crozier, 1964; Cyert and March, 1961). Although 
organizational politics may be central to organizations as such, it is important to note 
that organizational politics is different insofar as its involves the exercise of power in 
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the context of organizational domains rather than civil society or the state (Perrow, 
1986). While the state and civil society might interface with organizations in a 
number of ways (see Böhm et al, 2008), the focus of our paper will be on 
organizational power rather than the political machinations that occur within the state 
or civil society.  
A final point of clarification. Power generally has negative connotations when 
it comes to understanding organizational life. It usually signifies coercion, the 
maintenance of hierarchies and subordinated positions. But as Clegg, Courpasson and 
Phillips (2006) correctly note, this is a one-sided ‘negative’ view of the concept 
because it is deemed a force that largely quells dissent and alternative voices. It may 
certainly function in this manner, as much of the literature we review attests. But the 
phenomena may also prove to be very positive in some situations. As Clegg, et al. 
(2006) point out, “we do not think that organizational life and politics are necessarily 
nasty and backstabbing. They often are, but power need not always be regarded as 
something to be avoided. Power can be a very positive force; it can achieve great 
things” (Clegg et al., 2006: 3).  
In order to clarify the vast variety of negative and positive approaches, 
assumptions and theories regarding how power unfolds in and around organizations, 
we will posit our own taxonomy that we hope will aid future research. Building on 
Lukes (2005) and Fleming and Spicer (2007) we identify four ‘faces’ of power: 
coercion, manipulation, domination and subjectification. Each face may play out on 
four ‘sites’: power ‘in’, ‘through’ ‘over’ and ‘against’ the organization. The paper 
argues that these expressions of power may be ‘episodic’ (such as coercion and 
manipulation) as well as ‘systemic’ (such as domination and subjectification). Having 
explained these concepts in more detail, we then present a systematic review of the 
literature that as analyzed organizational power to date. In the final part of the paper, 
we reflect on possible areas of future research in management and organization 
science.    
  
Four Faces of Organizational Power  
 
There have been many attempts to map the different forms which power takes 
in organizations (e.g. Pfeffer, 1981; Clegg and Hardy, 1996; Clegg et al., 2006; Brass, 
2002; Ocasio, 2002; Mizruchi and Yoo, 2002; Anderson and Brion, 2014). One of the 
more enduring distinctions in the literature is between episodic theories of power (the 
direct exercise of power) and systemic forms of influence (power that is congealed 
into more enduring institutional structures) (Clegg, 1989; Lawrence et al, 2012). 
These two broad dimensions can be further divided up into four dimensions or ‘faces’ 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2007): coercion, manipulation, domination and subjectification 
(see Table One).  
The first two faces of power – coercion and manipulation – can be considered 
episodic modes of influence because they rely upon identifiable acts that shape the 
behavior of others. Domination and subjectification are faces of power that can be 
considered systemic because they mobilize institutional, ideological and discursive 
resources to influence organizational activity. As such they are often less visible than 








Theories of organizational power as coercion focus on the direct exercise of 
power by individuals to achieve certain political ends. Fleming and Spicer (2007: 14) 
observe that this “type of power involves someone getting another person to 
something that he or she would have not otherwise done. They are simply told what to 
do ‘or else’”. 
The research in this tradition builds on Robert Dahl’s (1957) conceptualization 
of power. These studies ask a simple question: what provides individuals with the 
ability to make another person (in an organizational context) to do something they 
would not otherwise do? Foundational studies here identify a range of bases of power 
that individuals draw upon in their political maneuvering (French and Raven, 1968). 
Psychological based investigations propose that certain personality types play an 
important role in shaping the propensity and ability of individuals to engage in 
organizational politics (House et al., 1968). Bureaucratic theories of power highlight 
that the scope an individual has to exercise political power is shaped by the official 
office they hold (Merton, 1957).  
Research in the later part of the twentieth century has observed how 
individuals tend to go beyond the legitimate authority vested in their position. Two 
findings are important here. First, an individual’s power within an organization 
depends on their ability to reduce uncertainty (Crozier, 1964), and second, the 
possession of resources considered valuable within the organization might determine 
an actor’s ability to coerce others to act in a particular way (Thompson, 1956; 




Power in and around organizations might also take the form of manipulation, 
whereby actors seek to either limit the issues that are discussed or fit issues within 
(what are perceived to be) acceptable boundaries. This type of power is concerned 
with agenda setting, as Fleming and Spicer (2007: 17) argue: “there is no direct 
exercise of coercion here. Instead, there is an implicit shaping of issues considered 
important or relevant”.  
Studies in this tradition have looked at how agendas are set in a range of ways. 
The construction and manipulation of rules is an important process. Selznick (1949), 
for example, demonstrated how issues are prevented from arising through reference to 
apparently objective and value-free criteria. Similarly, studies of gender in 
organizations observe how rules can equate masculine norms as organizational norms 
more generally, becoming an important political barrier for women moving up the 
ranks (Kanter, 1977). Further research in this tradition has explored how political 
dynamics not only shape these rules, but also manipulate practices so they appear to 
fit within predefined parameters (Clegg, 1975).  
Another way agendas are set in organizational life is by shaping the 
anticipated outcomes of various behaviors. This could involve the manipulation of 
individual perceptions regarding future expressions of power or their own ability to 
cope and react to it. For example, factory workers are often fostered with a sense of 
powerlessness and thus have low expectations regarding the outcomes of any planned 
political action (Gouldner, 1970). In this respect, agendas can be set through the 
mobilization of bias. This occurs when some assumptions or ideas are systematically 
inserted into decision-making protocols and others are organized out. For instance, 
 5 
particular assumptions have been shown to shape decision-making processes in the 
military or the location of crucial transport infrastructures (Alexander, 1979). Finally, 
agendas can be established by using one’s position within an organizational network 
to subtly influence decision-making processes. For example, an individual’s position 
may act as a bridge between two different social groups, presenting them with 
significant opportunity to shape the distribution of information and resources in the 




A good deal of theories of organizational power views it as a process of 
domination, whereby actors establish influence through the construction of 
ideological values that become hegemonic (or dominant). In Fleming and Spicer’s 
(2007) account of this face of power, they argue that there is little coercion or 
manipulation openly occurring. Instead, “this dimension of power shapes our very 
preferences, attitudes and political outlook” (Fleming and Spicer, 2007: 19). This idea 
builds upon Lukes’ (2005) famous ‘radical view’ of power, since it captures a type of 
politics that defines the very terrain in which political actors understand their 
organizational situation: 
 
Is not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept her role in the 
existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative 
to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable? (Lukes, 2005: 24). 
 
This approach to power asks the following question: how are arbitrary 
hierarchical relations made to appear inevitable, natural and thus unquestioned? Here, 
the notion of ideology refers to the creation of shared assumptions and ideals that 
produce limited preferences and wants (Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood, 1980). 
Organizational ideology can be cultivated through a range of techniques including 
corporate cultures (Mumby, 1987; Kunda, 1992), field-wide assumptions in particular 
industries (Simons and Ingram, 1997) or societal wide assumptions regarding the 
value of, say, technical rationality over other value systems (Alvesson, 1987).  
Related to this area of inquiry is the analysis of how organizations function as 
institutional domains. An important facet of institutionalization pertains to the way 
they make certain assumptions legitimate, standard and more prudent. There is now a 
substantial body of research on how institutions are created, maintained and destroyed 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). The important theme for our purposes concerns how 
institutions operate as political forces to shore up existing collective rules in a field. 
This leads to actors adopting practices not because they are necessarily more efficient, 
but because they are deemed expedient, providing a resource to garner broader 
legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). For example, large US corporations 
increasingly recruited CEOs from a financial or legal background during the 20th 
century as it made them appear to be reasonable in the eyes of the important financial 
actors and agencies (Fligstein, 1987).  
Ideological norms often do not go unchallenged. For example, social 
movements have also received a good deal of attention in the way they can 
institutionalized new ideological values and perceptions regarding important political 
concerns within an organizational field. Previously dominant ideologies – pertaining 
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to the environment or health issues, for example – may be usurped and replaced by an 
alternative set of values. As Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) state, this is an 
important corollary to theories of domination, since “it adds contestation, collective 
action, framing and self-conscious mobilization for alternatives to conceptual 
repertoires of legitimation, diffusion, isomorphism and self-reproducing taken-for-
granted practices” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008: 649).   
 
Subjectification 
      
The fourth face of organizational power is subjectification. This type of 
influence seeks to determine an actor’s very sense of self, including their emotions 
and identity. Fleming and Spicer (2007) define this face of power in relation to 
manipulation and domination discussed above: 
 
Here, the focus is not on decision-making or non-decision making, or the 
ideological suppression of conflict, but the constitution of the very person who 
makes decisions. According to [Michel] Foucault, power is achieved through 
defining the conditions of possibility underlying how we experience ourselves 
as people. Power, therefore, produces the kind of people we feel we naturally 
are (Fleming and Spicer, 2007: 23). 
  
While this face of power does bear superficial similarities to ideological 
domination, it is in fact quite distinct. Domination shapes what is considered worthy 
of political attention and effort. Subjectification goes deeper, constituting what the 
person is: their lived sense of identity and selfhood. Domination may ‘naturalize’ an 
extant social order whereas subjectification normalizes a particular way of being in 
that social order. As such, the focus in management and organization science is on 
how actors become composed as ‘subjects of power’ through a series of ‘micro-
practices’ which function on the level of everyday life (Foucault, 1977).  
Studies have shown how subjectification can be mobilized through a wide 
range of systems in contemporary organizations. Teams and surveillance may 
promote moments of self-monitoring, resulting in the gaze of the supervisor being 
enacted by the employees themselves (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Barker, 1993).  
Various forms of managerial knowledge or ‘discourses’ can have this influence over 
organizational life too, including Human Resource Management (Townley, 1993), 
strategy (Knights and Morgan, 1991) and accountancy (Hoskin and Macve, 1986). As 
a result, the very identities of organizational members are enlisted to achieve certain 
political ends (also see du Gay, 1996; Jacques, 1996).  
Particularly important in this stream of research is the role of discourse. That 
is, systems of talk and texts that construct social reality in distinctive ways that guide 
our behavior (Grant et al, 2004). There is now a large body of literature mapping the 
political influence of organizational discourse, especially in relation to normalization, 
truth claims and insidious forms of organizational indoctrination (Phillips and 
Oswick, 2012). These discourses of power can achieve political ends by organizing 
the everyday conduct of actors, especially their processes of self-reflection and self-
management (Holmqvist and Maravalias, 2011). Such political practices may occur 
within organizations, but also between and against the focal institution, as we shall 
soon see. 
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As Table 1. demonstrates, each face of power involves a difference set of 
tactics, resources and strategies to influence the outcomes and behaviors of other 
individuals in and around the focal organization. 
 
================ 
Insert Table One Here 
================ 
 
Four Sites of Organizational Power 
 
   We now will argue that the four faces of power occur in multiple locations 
in and around organizations. That is to say, coercion, manipulation, domination and 
subjectification might be enacted from different perspectives apropos the focal 
organization. To demonstrate this, the paper will evoke a spatial metaphor to map four 
additional dimensions, namely: power in the organization, through the organization, 
over the organization, and against organization. In explicating each category, current 
research and new opportunities to extend it can be identified, as we shall demonstrate 
in the discussion section.  
 
Power ‘In’ Organizations 
 
Power in organizations consists of struggles within its formal boundaries to 
influence, maintain or change hierarchies and norms. A good deal of literature on 
employer/employee conflict is relevant here. As are the studies that show how 
managerial command structures attempt to maintain internal regulation and negotiate 
shifting inter-organizational alliances.  
Resistance to change may also function in this domain. Micro-political 
activities that force superiors to listen to subordinate claims, such as those mentioned 
by Courpasson and Clegg (2012), are relevant here. As might be whistleblowers that 
radically alter the internal political system of a firm by revealing illegal or unethical 
interests (Near and Miceli, 1995).      
 
Power ‘Through’ Organizations 
 
Power through organizations occurs when an organization as a whole becomes 
a vehicle or agent to further certain political interests and goals. As an actor in its own 
right, organizations might wield its influence in certain markets, industries and 
countries to establish favorable operating environments. Other actors might enlist 
corporations too. The literature on corporate social responsibility and corporate 
citizenship, for example, has identified the way NGOs and civil society institutions 
might form alliances with the firm to achieve respective goals (poverty relief, human 
and civil rights, etc.).  
In other settings, firms might become the implicit vehicle for geopolitical 
objectives set by the state apparatus (securing oil supplies in the Middle East, for 
example). Corporate trade agreements are often arranged by governmental envoys 
because of the broader geopolitical benefits that might accrue. Likewise, media firms 





Power ‘Over’ Organizations 
 
Power over the organization points to the way in which elites might compete 
to influence the objectives, strategies and makeup of the organization. Management 
buyouts, private equity takeovers, shareholder activism and governmental attempts to 
regulate, nationalize or breakup the enterprise are prime examples of this dimension 
of political activity.  
Moreover, lobbying a firm to change the nature of its business model might be 
yet another example of this political dimension – animal rights groups boycotting an 
organization or publically revealing sensitive information might be a case in point. 
Shareholder activism is an important area of research here too. 
 
Power ‘Against’ Organizations 
 
And power against the organization concerns attempts to use extra-
organizational spaces to engage in political struggles in order to target organizational 
activity. This entails various groups who step outside of the political dynamics of the 
organization to find support in their efforts to create change within an organization, 
industries and sectors (Spicer and Böhm, 2007). This often occurs when 
organizational members participate in social movements to access wider networkers 
of supporters, resources, ideologies and identities, which in turn allow them to 
influence the focal organization.  
These extra-organizational spaces have proved to be very important in not 
only shaping organizational politics, but also creating political spaces that may yield 
alternative ways of organizing (e.g., non-market co-operatives, volunteer collectives, 
etc.). Research on social movements has especially made an important contribution to 
understanding this face of power, as we shall see in our review below.    
 
=================== 
Insert Table 2. About here 
=================== 
  
These four sites of power interconnect with the faces we discussed earlier. In 
mapping these interconnections, we are able to gain a more comprehensive and 
systematic overview of the way organizations become political entities (see Table 
Two). Moreover, this exercise provides us with a clearer idea about where future 
research efforts might be most fruitfully directed.  
 




Coercion is one of the most basic forms of political power in organizations. As 
we noted above, this entails actors seeking to use resources or bases of power which 
they have at their disposal to get someone to do something that they otherwise would 
not do (to paraphrase Dahl, 1957). This can be done (1) ‘in’ organizations by a 
powerful individual using various resources to cajole other organizational members to 
do something, (2) ‘through’ organizations when it becomes a collective actor 
mobilizing its own body of resources to change something in the external 
environment which otherwise would not change, (3) ‘over’ organizations when actors 
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use various resources to take control of that institution – through a takeover, or 
occupying the position of CEO for example, and (4) ‘against’ organizations when 
groups challenge and call into question the purpose of the institution.  
The coercive deployment of power differs from the other faces of power 
which we will analyze since it is the most obvious and observable. Because this face 
is more noticeable, it has been the focus of much organizational research. We will 
now outline some of the major insights from this body of research.  
 
1. Coercion ‘In’ organizations  
 
Much of the literature on coercion begins with Max Weber’s account of 
authority in modern societies (Weber, 1947). Weber argued that authority is no longer 
allocated on the basis of traditional social relationships such as kinship or religious 
convention. Instead, it is largely allocated on the basis of occupying particular 
positions within formal bureaucratic organizational structures. Authority is a property 
not of the person but of the office they occupy. So to occupy the position of CEO in a 
large corporation gives you significant scope and authority – but this is limited within 
particular jurisdictions. 
If we strictly follow this reasoning, the authority of any actor within an 
organization can be implied from their job title. To be sure, Weber does recognize the 
acceptation of charismatic authority in such formal settings, whereby personal 
magnetisms and dynamism play a role. However, in bureaucratic settings this is 
relatively rare and highly unpredictable. The upshot is that formal bureaucratic 
authority is the central characteristics of modern organizations, and it is from whence 
the power of the manager flows. 
Much of the literature on coercive power in post-war organization theory 
responds to this central Weberian thesis. It revealed that there was frequently a certain 
disconnect between the authority of the office and the power these individuals were 
able to wield. This is explained in French and Raven’s (1959) theory about bases of 
power. In this theoretical investigation, they pointed out that individuals in 
organizations do not just derive their power from their positions of authority, but 
other sources too, including their expertise, being a reference point in a social group, 
the ability to punish and reward or being able to coerce and provide information (for 
an updated account see Raven, 1992).  
This model has enhanced our understandings of how actors acquire power 
within organizations. For example, investigations of project managers demonstrate 
how they draw on a range of bases of power in order to advance their project 
(Willemon and Gemmil, 1971). However, bases of power deemed most valuable tend 
to be mediated and defined by organizational structure. Another study on participation 
in the Netherlands found that attempts to create workplace equality were often 
thwarted by the unequal distribution of expertise (Mulder, 1971). Ultimately, the 
ability to enact power directly cannot be equated only with a position of authority. 
Other facets play an important role in this regard.  
This insight was explored in another body of research concerning control over 
sources of uncertainty. Such uncertainty may be external to the organization – such as 
market demand - or internal to the enterprise such as a production process. An actor’s 
ability to control these contingencies becomes central when organizational 
functionality is dependent on it. This in turn yields power. This is what Michel 
Crozier’s (1964) found in his classic ethnographic study of the distribution of power 
in a cigarette factory. He was surprised by how powerful the production maintenance 
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personnel were. Upon closer inspection, he discovered that these staff controlled the 
central source of uncertainty within the firm. Because it was a national monopoly, the 
company could sell as many cigarettes as they produced. The only uncertainty was 
whether the machines remained operational, a contingency that the machinists 
controlled. This gave them much coercive power within the factory.  
Crozier’s research was further developed in the influential Aston Studies. 
These investigations found that control over both external and internal sources of 
uncertainty within a firm tends to engender a particular sub-unit with more power 
than would be expected (Hinings et al, 1974). Similar findings have been made in 
related research. For example, in a study of hospitals, life insurance companies and 
colleges, Hambrick (1981) observed that top executives who were able to control core 
sources of uncertainty through ‘environmental scanning’ made them the most 
powerful members within the top management team.    
A related observation was made by studies of resource dependency, which 
become popular during the mid-1970s, especially following the insights of Hickson et 
al. (1971). In a now classic investigation, Pfeffer and Salanick (1974) asked what it 
was that gave particular departments within a large public university coercive power. 
They discovered that control over resources that were rare and central to the 
organization’s functioning was the key source of such power – in this case, external 
research grants. They noted a rather perverse dynamic that developed as a result, 
whereby departments which already had resources were given more.  
Many other studies have confirmed this core insight. For example, Pfeffer and 
Moore (1980) found that university faculties tended to gain more power if they exist 
in a relative coherent organizational field that gave them access to external funding. A 
related questionnaire based study found that units which had captured resource flows 
within the organization had significantly more power to coerce other units, even those 
that were ostensibly more superior (Astley and Zajac, 1990). Indeed, the study of 
resource dependencies is a large and elaborate research area that has generated many 
insights (for a comprehensive review see Hillman et al., 2009). It has been so 
successful that many studies actually define and operationalize power as simply the 
control over scarce resources. However, there is a danger that in doing so, researchers 
ignore the wide range of possible sources of power that we cover in this review.  
 
2. Coercion ‘Through’ Organizations 
 
This site of power suggests that organizations can be used to influence the 
broader organizational field in a number of ways. The organization becomes an actor 
in its own right. For example, the studies mentioned above have noted how the 
possession of resources are not just valuable to an organization, but also provide the 
focal organization with significant power within the external supply chain or sector. It 
has also been highlighted how institutions in a subordinate or dependent position can 
mean some actors are at the mercy of the demands made upon them by the focal 
organization in question. These can be very coercive relationships.   
Studies of coercive power ‘through’ the organization reveal how critical 
resources can aid the organization to either control other organizations within their 
sector, or conversely decrease the power which other institutions have over them. It 
also highlights how alternative paths of action might be used to decrease resource 
dependency, including social networks and subtle forms of manipulation from the 
field (Elg and Johansson, 1997).  
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The use of technology by an organization has been shown to have coercive 
power effects over other institutions within its domain (Morris et al, 2003). This in 
turn can change the power relationships within the firm itself as the demands of 
buyers and distributors change around the new technology. Other research has 
demonstrated how the coercive power that certain resources confer to an organization 
can be mediated by other factors. For example, relationships of long-term 
commitment can mitigate the way organizations enact power over other institutions 
within its field (Provan and Glassenheimer, 1994).  
A further line of research has sought to understand how the possession of 
resources can help an organization fend off unwanted intrusions from the 
environment. For example, access to crucial power bestowing resources can help 
organizations survive during periods of crisis (Lamburg and Pajunen, 2005). Finally, 
a study of human service organizations in the US found that firms with many linkages 
with the environment were able to control the coercive power wielded by larger 
organizations they depend upon for resources (Provan et al, 1980).  
 
3. Coercion ‘Over’ organizations  
 
 Coercive power not only transpires in and through organizations. This kind of 
influence may also occur over them, in which actors and institutions attempt to exert 
authority over the direction of the organization. Here coercion refers to the forcible 
imposition of certain interests and objectives over the focal institution in question. 
Coercion tends to be visible to the actors involved, and is typically obeyed because 
there is little other choice within the social relationship. While we usually view this 
kind of power as deriving from sources beyond the formal boundaries of the firm, 
agents within the focal organization may also enact it in order to redirect the 
institution as a whole. For example, this may occur when there is a strategic 
realignment of senior management, exerting new forms of governance over the firm.  
This last point has attracted attention in management and organization science 
in relation to coercive political relationships. Indeed, perhaps the key body of research 
builds on the ‘upper-echelons’ approach to power (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Hambrick, 2007). These studies are based on the observation that the composition, 
structure and processes of top management teams have a significant impact on the 
way the entire organization functions.  
One important theme running throughout this ‘upper echelons’ approach to 
power concerns the role of CEOs. What are the factors that give some CEOs more 
power over their organization than others? Typical answers include control over 
scarce and crucial resources (Hambrick, 1981). In other words, some CEOs achieve 
coercive power over the organization because they have access to scarce bodies of 
resource that others do not.  
Subsequent research has gone on to explore the effects that powerful CEOs 
have on their organizations. For example, some studies have found that powerful 
CEOs tend to take more risks, leading to an ‘outlier performance’ – either particularly 
high or particularly low (Tang et al, 2011). Moreover, they are also likely to initiate 
increased levels of strategic change (Greve and Mitsuhashi, 2007) and also benefit 
from higher levels of remuneration (Barkema and Pennings, 1998). This research 
highlights how the relative coercive power of CEOs in the top management team over 
the organization as a whole is dependent on the critical resources that they have 
access to. Such resources allow those taking control over the organization to make 
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more risky decisions, but also defend themselves against demands which others actors 
such as buyers and suppliers might have. 
 
 
4. Coercion ‘Against’ the Organization   
 
 Coercive power against the organization pertains to the way coercive force 
may be used to oppose and challenge the focal organization, to the point where its 
very existence may be threaten. In the management and organization studies 
literature, there is less research on this particular topic. However, social movement 
theory has examined how protest groups and collectives can mobilize resources in 
order to mount challenges to dominant organizations (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).  
This is an interesting area, since like other organizations, social movements 
depend upon scarce resources to maintain their campaign to coerce other institutions 
to change. This might come in the form of money, recruits, or knowledge to name just 
a few resource bases. The availability of these resources tends to shape whether a 
movement will thrive or decline. For example, the accessibility of many young, 
educated and enthusiastic recruits with free time during the 1960s allowed social 
movements to thrive during this period (Davis and Thompson, 1994). Furthermore, a 
social movement can then become a mechanism for mobilizing and directing these 
resources in pursuit of a particular change project. This point is very well illustrated in 
Davis and Thompson’s (1994) study of the shareholder activist movement. They 
demonstrate how these activists mobilized a range of resources including money and 
expertise in order to coercively challenge widespread understandings of corporate 
governance and push forward more pro-shareholder measures within this space. 
 Another study of an effective social movement focuses on the importance of 
coercively challenging the legitimacy of certain organizations and industries. In an 
extensive longitudinal investigation of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union 
(WCTU) between 1870-1920, Hiatt et al. (2009) reveal how the movement 
undermined the legitimacy of alcohol among consumers. Leveraging the virtues of 
sobriety and family values, the aggressive opposition to the longstanding practice of 
alcohol consumption was successful, leading to the vast closure of breweries. 
Importantly, the WCTU presented a viable alternative – soft drinks or soda. As a 
result, this variant of beverage exponentially escalated in production and 
consumption, leading to the rise of an alternative sector that replaced the preference 




If coercion refers to the direct exercise of power, which is often supported by 
control over sources of uncertainty and key resources, then manipulation involves a 
less direct form of influence. It functions through carefully managing what is on the 
table for debate and who is able to participate in the debate (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963). Such agenda setting often relies on rhetorical and persuasion skills, and 
perhaps most importantly, access to key social networks. We suggest that this can 
operate through four sites: (1) manipulation in the organization that gives an 
organizational member power that goes beyond what a simple analysis of resources 
would predict, (2) broader processes of manipulation or persuasion undertaken by an 
organization as a whole in order to give it power over other actors such as external 
stakeholders, (3) control over processes of persuasion and networks which gives an 
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actor or group power over an organization and finally (4) the use of manipulation to 
question and challenge the power of the focal organization.  
 
1. Manipulation ‘In’ Organizations 
 
Much of the literature on manipulation within organizations builds upon the 
insight that those who control scarce resources tend to also have power. However, this 
gives rise to an important question: why or how exactly did these people gain access 
to this power base? To address this question, many researchers have turned to 
processes of manipulation that utilize networks, impression management and strategic 
narratives.  
Investigations focusing on the construction and leveraging of social networks 
have yielded very interesting findings regarding the way manipulation occurs in 
organizations (for a review see Kilduff and Brass, 2010). The central insight of this 
rich line of inquiry is that the building and maintenance of social networks is an 
important way power can be exercised despite the control over resources.  
For example, evidence suggests that the power of a unit depends on its 
centrality within organizational social networks and the resources it controls 
(Hackman, 1985). According to Bozionelos’ (2005) study of hiring decisions in a 
university, network building and use of informal social connections can become a 
central aspect for swaying decisions. Such networks may enable alternative ways of 
enacting organizational designs, such as the implementation of new technology 
(Burkhardt and Brass, 1990). Related research has demonstrated how building co-
operative ties within an organization can be an important way actors bypass resource 
dependencies and the political weaknesses that may engender (Gargiulo, 1993), 
Similarly, Gresov and Stephen’s (1993) study of a large US company found that inter-
unit attempts to manipulate a political agenda were often triggered by resource 
constraints (Gresov and Stephens, 1993). Gender too may be an important factor is 
whether a social network is able to manipulate decision-making criteria within the 
organization (Ibarra, 1992; Ibarra and Andrews, 1993).  
As well as building social networks to manipulate a political agenda, actors 
may also use more informal techniques in the organization. An early study conducted 
by Spekman (1979) demonstrated that if an actor occupies the position of a boundary 
spanner they are able to convey information that reduces uncertainty. This in turn 
tends to give them power within the organization. Maitlis’ (2004) study of two 
symphony orchestras found that despite the lack of formal authority, directors were 
able to enact power through careful impression management. As a result, directors 
selectively shared information in order to protect their authority and manipulate core 
issues.  
The role of impression management to manipulate the debates and issues in 
the organization was highlighted in a study of teaching hospitals in the US (Roos and 
Hall, 1980). Departments that fostered higher levels of external credibility often had 
greater power within the organization. However, this additional power also provoked 
unwanted attention. Otherwise powerful and credible units became ‘garbage cans’ 
where a wide range of complex issues were dumped (Roos and Hall, 1980). 
Nevertheless, the cultivation of external credibility allows actors to have a good deal 
of sway over the kind of issues that are considered important for the organization.  
In a related area of research it has been found that actors can manipulate 
organizational agendas by the proficient use of cultural resources like stories, 
narratives and rituals. For example, Humphrey and Brown’s (2002) investigation of a 
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UK teaching hospital found that power was exercised through the mobilization of 
stories and symbolism to legitimate technological change (Humphreys and Brown, 
2002). What is particularly striking is that these stories were each crafted in quite 
different ways in order to appeal to different audiences. This suggests that the 
exercise of agenda manipulation depends on the ability to match stories with the 
target audience.  
How technology is understood and used within the organization often relies 
upon political manipulation by actors to ensure that it serves their interests. Spicer’s 
(2005) investigation of online innovations in an Australian public broadcaster found 
that various groups championed different representations of the technology in order to 
manipulate its organizational legitimacy. In a similar study of technological 
implementation, Ball and Wilson (2000) found that the use of stories and narratives 
was central to the agenda setting process. However, these stories and narratives may 
have broader structural consequences such as the marginalization of women in the 
organization.   
 
2. Manipulation ‘Through’ Organizations 
 
Organizations as a whole may resort to manipulating the political decision-
making criteria of institutional fields, sectors and other organizations beyond their 
boundaries. Manipulating external stakeholders and organizational sectors often relies 
upon other types of power, such as the coercion of the state or strong networks 
between the focal organization and other actors. However, it differs from coercion 
since it relies upon prefixing the decision-making parameters other actors use to make 
sense of what might be deemed reasonable behavior.     
An early study of this process traced the role of lobbying by a range of 
organizations in shaping federal policy around business and economic issues of 
importance (Aplin and Hegarty, 1980). The investigation found businesses engaged in 
the selective provision of information to members of congress about particular topics 
of concern, but also sought to apply political pressure through bodies such as think 
tanks and action committees (which were a relatively unknown feature of politics 
when the study was written). This research found that coercive power - such as public 
pressure - tended to be far less effective in shaping legislation than manipulation. This 
is because the selective provision of information, informal political connections and 
the use of mediating bodies heightened the appearance of democratic deliberation, 
which direct force was less able to accomplish.  
The importance of such manipulation ‘through’ organizations was echoed in 
another investigation, which focused on the influence of the South Korean corporate 
elite (Seigel, 2007). This qualitative field study was coupled with extensive 
quantitative analysis to identify how ties with the political elite can shape the fate of 
particular corporate sectors. Seigel’s (2007) study found that connections between the 
political and business elite were often based around fixed localities and stemmed from 
connections established in elite high schools and universities. This allowed the 
political elite to partially influence the agenda within large firms, and subtly 
manipulate decision-making frameworks therein. Following a major change in the 
makeup of the political elite, some corporations would lose power within the 
economy since state support was vital for business success, especially in relation to 
establishing cross-border alliances. Given the strong elite networks between the 
economy and state, governmental power holders are able to significantly influence 
 15 
corporate decisions while still appearing independent and far removed from particular 
business activities.  
  Organizations may also act as agents of manipulation by establishing certain 
boundary conditions that newcomers in the field must accept in order to legitimately 
do business. This is especially so in relation to first-mover entrepreneurial firms that 
have been influential in constructing the basic operating principles in a new sector or 
industry. For example, Santos and Eisenhardt (2009) noted the presence of 
manipulation in their study of entrepreneurial firms. These firms manipulated 
latecomers by establishing discursive boundaries that demarcated what is inside and 
outside the market. This type of power significantly shaped the internal agenda of 
organizations within this field, especially in relation to what was deemed acceptable 
and non-acceptable institutional practice. The exercise of this ‘soft power’ allowed 
entrepreneurial organizations to gain dominance over other actors within a rapidly 
growing market.    
 
3. Manipulation ‘Over’ the Organization  
 
Power may also be enacted over organizations through mechanisms of 
manipulation. This is where the agenda regarding the political issues that may and 
may not be discussed within the organization are controlled by informal actors or 
groups that sway important decisions. This may be achieved through social networks, 
direct attempts to engage influential actors to strengthen one’s power over the firm, 
and use of rhetorical appeals to maintain the certain operating norms within the 
organization. The research in this area suggests that these processes of manipulation 
may be used by actors within the firm (especially new arrivals with influential 
networks beyond the focal organization or department) and by agents external to the 
organization – including activists and shareholders.  
Perhaps the richest area pertaining to manipulation over the organization can 
be found in research exploring the role of social networks. For example, Allen and 
Panian (1982) demonstrate how family ties between an organization’s CEO and the 
owning family is more likely to make the CEO less likely to be challenged on the 
basis of poor performance. The political agenda is influenced by the very ties that the 
CEO has to powerful parties. Other research highlights how a CEO’s perceived power 
within broader social networks allows them to shape the nature and meaning of 
important decisions over the organization – such as accepting a market offer or not 
(Daveni and Kesner, 1993). These networks may also allow newcomers to exact more 
power over the nature of the organization. For example, a study of change in South 
Korean universities found that new arrivals were better able to manipulate the 
rationale for change if they were relatively familiar with powerful actors within the 
upper echelons of the university structure (Kim et al, 2007).   
A related area of research highlights how CEOs can transform the overall 
direction of the organization, especially when they are deemed new arrivals. The 
ability to manipulate social relations is important here. In a number of studies by 
Westphal and colleagues, (Westphal, 1998; Westphal and Stern, 2006; Wesphal and 
Bedner, 2008) it was shown that informal sources of power can allow the CEO to 
inordinately shift the nature of the firm in important ways. For example, in one study, 
it is reported that interpersonal influence mediates the role of influence that a CEO 
has over the organization (Westphal, 1998). Another investigation finds that CEOs 
who engage in ingratiating behavior towards fund managers are able to garner more 
power over their institution, as are the fund managers (Wesphal and Stern, 2006). 
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Such ingratiating behavior towards any given CEO is likely to shape whether a 
manager will be appointed to a board the CEO sits on and the agenda that determines 
such a decision (Westphal and Bedner, 2008). All these studies suggest the informal 
manipulative dynamics are a vital mechanism for enabling CEOs to gain complete 
control over the organization.  
There is a good deal of research that shows how sense-making and symbolism 
is crucial to manipulative power over an entire organization. When the change process 
is significant – often triggered by external stakeholders – the way the change is made 
sense of becomes central to compliance and buy-in. Clark (2004) provides an 
interesting example of this process of manipulation in relation to the massive post-
soviet era restructuring of organizations in the Czech Republic (Clark, 2004). The 
study found that although managers faced significant constraints in their attempts to 
restructure the business, they were able to influence the business through careful 
symbolic and political manipulation. This established different paths for entirely 
restructuring these organizations. A decisive mediating role in an actor’s ability to 
manipulate the sense-making properties of an organization is perceived self-
empowerment. Lee (1999) found this in her investigation of a complaint lodged in a 
primary school by an external authority. To understand whether the complaint could 
be powerful enough to reorganize the school, the study found that managers could 
only do so if they manipulated member’s sense making attributes, which in turn 
depended on the self-perceptions of managers regarding their level of influence.   
The role of external agents in gaining control over organizations has been 
studied in relation to manipulation. Maguire et al. (2004) present a germane example 
in their analysis of how HIV activists influenced the decision-making processes 
around the pricing and availability of anti-retroviral drugs produced by large 
pharmaceutical companies. The study found that activist groups mobilized a range of 
discourses in order to successfully manipulate the political agenda within the 
pharmaceutical firms in a number of ways.   
The role of shareholders over organizations has also received attention in 
relation to manipulation. For example, David et al. (2001) argue that the pre-existing 
structural advantage of powerful shareholders may allow them to champion for 
particular issues that would affect the organization as a whole. David et al. (2001) 
demonstrate that shareholder activists often resorted to forms of power beyond the 
formal avenues they would normally use in having their voice heard. Informal 
influence, through networks and political campaigning, were utilized to place issues 
of concern on the agenda that would have never appeared otherwise.   
 
4. Manipulation ‘Against’ Organizations  
 
 Manipulation can also occur ‘against’ the organization. This is where the 
political agenda is shifted by broader stakeholders who oppose the operational 
principles of the focal organization, seeking to challenge its dominance by changing 
the terms of debate in a manner that undermines the status quo. From our evaluation 
of the literature, the process of manipulation generally occurs within the broader 
institutional environment that the organization exists, but in a way that disrupts the 
decision-making capacities and political agenda of the firm in question. Such 
activities are different to coercion against the organization (as discussed above) 
because it usually evokes public opinion, political values and rhetorical persuasion to 
turn consumers, government officials and even society against the firm. Three 
examples of management inquiry regarding this site of power are illustrative.  
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 Böhm, Spicer and Fleming (2008) examine the way in which the multinational 
firm is successfully challenged by various groups opposing international commodity 
chains, labor exploitation and environmental damage. They evoke the Italian theorist 
Antonio Gramsci to argue that these challenges are often achieved when new social 
movements manipulate the political climate in which firms garner legitimacy from 
important institutional supporters. They point to the example of the fast-food firm 
McDonalds. This company was successfully challenged by strategically undermining 
the legitimacy of the fast-food production process in relation to labor rights and the 
environment. The campaign manipulated the systems of representation that the firm 
had built into its brand, making it almost impossible for McDonald’s to promote itself 
without also engaging with important social issues that the anti-McDonald’s 
movement had raised against the multinational organization.  
 According to Böhm et al. (2008), the politics of manipulation over 
organizations appears to require more grass-roots levels of activity. Because the focal 
firm – say, McDonalds – will generally not formally accept alternative narratives 
regarding its business practices, protest movements resort to informal and infra-
political means to challenge the firm. This is what Carty (2001) found in her case 
study of Nike and the new social movement that opposed its extensive use of child 
labor and sweatshops in South East Asia. Social media and the Internet were vital for 
the relatively successful Anti-Nike campaign pursued by activists such as San 
Francisco-based Global Exchange. Manipulation occurred by generating and 
disseminating information about the firm’s employment practices to such an extent 
that consumer tastes radically altered. As a result, the organization was forced to 
acknowledge and debate the question of child labor, a task it was not well prepared 
for. The political agenda in and around the firm was significantly shifted, but most 
importantly, in a manner that Nike had no choice but to engage with. 
      The use of informal campaigning to manipulate the agenda so that 
organizations address certain social, political and ethical issues often draws upon 
formal institutional actors to strengthen its cause. Palazzo and Richter (2005) note this 
in relation to the tobacco industry. For many years the anti-smoking social 
movements were largely organized by civil society groups that aimed to raise 
awareness among consumers through informal marketing tactics. However, once 
NGOs, the World Health Organization and then governments were persuaded, the 
movement could more formally manipulate the agenda pertaining to the decision-
making criteria used within large tobacco multinationals. As a result, companies like 
Philip Morris could no longer ignore the health effects of their products and were 
forced to participate in the debate – mainly with the help of lobbying groups and 
marketing consultants. As a consequence, their rhetoric turned from denial, to 
‘consumer choice’ and then to Corporate Social Responsibility, all of which have 
been successfully criticized by an emergent political agenda pertaining to deadly 
nature of the product.       
          
Domination 
 
Organizational political behavior mobilizes power through domination when 
actors seek to ideologically determine the terrain of action (and non-action) and thus 
attain certain political goals or curbing the articulation of other interests and voices. 
Ideology can be used for these ends when the cultural, normative or symbolic 
environment is shaped (1) by powerful interests ‘in’ the organization, (2) by actors 
‘through’ the organization, (3) by external actors ‘over’ the organization to align 
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institutional practices with a particular agenda or (4) by competing interests ‘against’ 
the organization. Domination differs from the preceding faces of power – coercion 
and manipulation – because it relies upon ‘soft constraint’ (Clegg, et al. (2006) to 
shape the logic of the organization and its field of action. Let us now survey the 
different sites where this face of power may be enacted in and around the 
contemporary organization.  
 
1. Domination ‘In’ Organizations 
 
 A good deal of the empirical research concerning domination focuses on its 
practice ‘in’ the organization. These studies center on the way power can shape the 
normative climate of the organization to make its socially constructed reality (or its 
intentional change) seem inevitable and natural. Much of the research derives from a 
critical understanding of power (Jermier, 1998). While certain organizational realities 
may appear to be the product of efficiency or functional necessity, research has 
identified the way this perception is actively molded by certain political interests. 
Accordingly, the question driving this stream of research is: why do subordinates 
frequently accept with their own subordination?  
While traditional coercion and agenda manipulation may partly answer this 
question – especially in the context of labor market pressures and the ‘dull 
compulsion of economic necessity’ (Marx, 1867/1972), investigations of workplace 
relations have also pointed to the ideological component that we have suggested is 
central to domination as an enactment of power (also see Courpasson, 2000). The 
advantage of this research is the way it demonstrates how vested interests use the 
veneer of ‘disinterestedness’ to further certain objectives within the organization – 
usually in terms of consolidating asymmetrical social relations. For Benschop and 
Dooreward (1998), this type of political activity might be referred to ‘hegemony’. 
This is where the interests of a superordinate minority come to be perceived as the 
interests of all organizational members. The maintenance of such elite power often 
relies upon institutional resources to determine the ‘cultural rules’ that govern the 
firm – such as organizational-wide appraisal systems (Barlow, 1989). Indeed, 
resource dependency theory has been particularly useful for studying how other 
organizational groups are ideologically co-opted by resource allocation opportunities 
(Currie et al., 2012; Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990).  
  An important facet of this face of power in organizations is the strategic use of 
autonomy and what critical labor process theorists label ‘indetermination’. This is the 
gap between official management commands and their actual enactment by 
employees (see Edwards, 1987; Sewell, 1998). The active consent and approval of 
subordinates – especially those that might otherwise be expected to resist – is often 
suggestive of the absence of power and control. However, research on organizational 
domination is useful for demonstrating how such consent can be manufactured, 
usually by enlisting and accentuating moments of self-determination, reputational 
self-management and trust to further certain interests (Romme, 1999; Clegg and 
Courpasson, 2004; Reed, 2001). This type of organizational politics occurs in the 
everyday practices of organizational life, often times somewhat removed from the 
structures of power indicative of coercion and manipulation (Gordon et al., 2009). For 
those in the upper echelons of the organization, domination is considered especially 
effective because the perception that the firm is highly political (in the traditional 
sense of the term of overt actor bias and agenda following) may have a major negative 
impact on job satisfaction and loyalty (Gandz and Murray, 1980).  
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A useful example of how domination evokes the everyday activities of 
workers in order to depoliticize an otherwise political environment can be found in 
Contu and Willmott’s (2003) excellent analysis of organizational learning. As they 
suggest, nothing could be considered less political than learning. How could anyone 
be ‘against’ learning? However, they demonstrate how this semblance of neutrality is 
used to effectively justify and sanction particular relations of inequality within 
organizations, especially between top management and lower ranking members. As 
Blacker and McDonald (2000) and Vince (2001) also note in their investigations of 
organizational learning, for many employees, this variant of power is difficult to resist 
because the ideological terrain of the ‘learning organization’ and ‘organizational 
knowledge’ de-politicizes concrete power differentials, making them appear 
unquestionable and beyond debate (also see Swan and Scarborough, 2005).      
Domination might also be an important face of power in organizations when 
some kind of change program is introduced, especially if the change is expected to 
prompt opposition or dissent. For example, in their study of the introduction of a 
highly contested Total Quality Management system in a UK bank, Knights and 
McCabe (1997, 1998) argue that the discursive delivery of such management systems 
is symbolically orchestrated to make them appear inevitable and without alternative. 
Similarly, Feldman (1989) argues that regimes of technology are inscribed with 
‘idealized’ attributes – often entailing psychodynamic processes that make them 
difficult to question, even when organizational members feel threatened and 
discontented by them (Bloomfield and Coombes, 1992; Bloomfield and Hayes, 2009).     
Investigations of domination in organizations have also been helpful for 
understanding how minority or marginalized groups are incorporated into structures 
that first appear against their political interests. The study of professions is 
noteworthy in this regard. According to Guest and King’s (2004) analysis of human 
resource managers, for example, these groups frequently feel marginalized by the 
organizational power elite, and attempt to garner legitimacy by over-identifying with 
the vocabulary and symbolic attributes of the very actors they feel disenfranchised by 
(also see Brivot, 2011; Waring and Currie, 2009). Similar processes of domination 
occur in relation to gender and ethical minority groups. According to Wiley and 
Eskilson’s investigation (1982), for example, successful managers require ‘male’ 
attributes, which both excludes woman and incorporates them into the organizational 
structure as they seek to compete with males. Such domination is often subtly 
bolstered by network opportunities with influential actors, which are inexplicably 
absent for those who do not meet the while/male norms and ideational frameworks 
that underlie institutional life (Ibarra, 1995).    
 
2. Domination ‘Through’ Organizations         
 
 The next site of domination pertains to the way organizations might behave as 
actors in their own right to manage, change and control other institutional players 
within the field. This site differs to domination ‘in’ the organization because it 
focuses on the way organizations as a whole may act as agents to ideologically 
dominate stakeholders, competitors and customers to achieve desirable outcomes and 
goals. At this site of analysis, domination functions outwards rather than inwards - 
even thought there might obviously still be processes of domination occurring within 
its organizational boundaries. The emphasis of these studies is on the normative, 
cultural and ideological facet of power, determining the institutional environment 
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through shaping the values and preferences of other actors for vested purposes 
(Barley, 2010). Three research areas focus on domination ‘through’ organizations. 
Organizations have long been known to dominate state, civil society and other 
important actors through ideological framing and political lobbying (Mills, 1965; 
Lukes, 2005; Clegg, 1990). Given the rise of the corporation in the West, political 
scientists and sociologists have revealed how corporations can influence democratic 
agendas to serve their narrow interests (Perrow, 1990). However, given the 
importance of this issue today, management research has recently turned to study it 
too, especially in relation to the corporation’s power to determine governmental and 
civil society issues through it sheer institutional dominance.  
Barley’s (2010) excellent analysis of elites, lobbying and the hegemonic status 
of the corporation in the US is illustrative of how organizations can ideologically 
determine other actors to further their interests. For Barley (2010), while political 
science and sociology has a strong tradition of focusing on this topic, organization 
theorists have typically down played the way organizations can act as political ‘game 
changers’ within the governmental sector: “although organizational theorists have 
given much attention to how environments shape organizations, they have given 
much less attention to how organizations mold their environments” (Barley, 2010: 
777). 
The important aspect of Barley’s (2010) study for us is the way corporate 
influence is not simply a correlate of ‘raw’ economic might. A massive amount of 
lobbying and ‘politicking’ is required to shape the moral preferences and ideological 
tenor of governmental officials in order to gain advantageous legislation and policy 
outcomes. According to Barley (2010), ideological domination is achieved as soon as 
corporate institutions separate citizenry power from economic power, which is 
achieved through campaigning for the predominance of economic rationality over 
other modes of ethical reasoning (also see Reed, 2012).  
Similar processes of domination are revealed in Ker and Robinson’s (2012) 
analysis of the rise of the Scottish banking sector. This study seeks to understand how 
a relatively national and conservative industry rose to become a leader in global 
finance. They map the ideological struggle that was waged between the banking elite, 
national governmental regulators and international bodies. One of the chief means 
these banks used to become influential players in global financial was unrelenting 
lobbying in order to dominate the moral perceptions of lawmakers and regulators. 
Banking elites convinced the institutional field of the unquestionable superiority of 
economic reason, establishing its ideological authority over other actors that only 
relaxed after the global economic crisis.    
A similar method of domination through organizations has been noted in 
relation to climate change and the subduing of environmental activists. Levy and 
Egan (2003) studied eight European and US automobile firms and oil companies to 
illustrate how these corporations have attained an ideological hegemony over 
governmental decision-makers in relation to climate change. In particular, these 
organizations shaped the ideological environment by using civil society forums. 
While various NGO’s and activist groups contested this intrusion, firms were still able 
to use their access to constrain the broader political landscape in significant ways 
(also see Topal, 2009). Indeed, on a global scale, this ideological capture of 
governmental interests has even justified the use of violence to quell oppositional 
groups, as Banerjee (2008) notes in relation to his notion of ‘necrocapitalism’.  
Domination through organizations is often not as straightforward as the above 
cases would have us believe. Influencing an organizational field frequently involves 
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complexities, contradictions and ambiguities in practice. This is what Leitch and 
Davenport (2005) discovered in their study of a public research agency in New 
Zealand. Rather than directly lobby for ideological support, the agency intentionally 
fostered a ‘strategic ambiguity’ within its goals in order to align disparate 
stakeholders. Indeed, in the context of low institutional supports, as was the case in 
the Ghanaian organizations studied by Lyon (2006), ideological domination was 
secured through informal bonds of trust and cooperation. While having the same 
effect of straightforward ideological domination, networks of trust are more difficult 
to resist since they appeared to be based upon loyalty and friendship rather than 
political and economic dependence. 
 
 
3. Domination ‘Over’ Organizations      
 
 The third face of power in our framework attends to the way organizations can 
be controlled, shaped and influenced by putatively external factors. This face of 
power, as we have already mentioned, pertains to field level determinants that can 
exert force over the focal institution. This perspective points to exogenous influences 
– be they from merging firms, the state apparatus and resource rich partners. 
However, as also revealed in earlier sections, given the highly networked and 
interconnected nature of contemporary organizational firms, agents within the 
organization may also enact such external influence. For example, the financialization 
of many organizational fields has fostered ideological frames that are enforced by 
within-firm members (e.g., financial modeling, appraisal systems, etc.) even though 
the initial catalyst derived from the broader environmental context (Morgan and 
Sturdy, 2000). Moreover, extra organizational networks can overwhelm decisions 
made within organizations given the wider community of interests and political 
maneuvering that they may represent (McGiven and Dopson, 2010).    
 As with the above sites of power, domination focuses on the role that 
ideological and cultural conditioning has from external stakeholders on the focal 
organization. Pfeffer’s book The External Control of Organizations (2003) initiated a 
rich avenue of conceptualizing how firms are often embedded in webs of influence 
that they are dependent upon in order to act. As Pfeffer ( 2003) explains, “the need for 
resources including financial and physical resources as well as information, obtained 
from the environment, made organizations dependent on the external sources of these 
resources” (Pfeffer, 2003 xii). We suggest that such influence may also include 
ideological forms that organizations are required to adopt in order to achieve their 
goals; either as precondition for resource allocation or as an outcome of 
interconnected networks between organizational decision-makers and the external 
institutional field. We identify four key areas of research that have focused on 
domination over organizations.  
 Firstly, organizations are often enabled and constrained by the ideological 
context imposed upon them by the national state and governmental apparatus. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated how the state plays an important role in 
ideological directing the activities of organizations, especially corporations within the 
international domain (Goodstein and Valumuri, 2009). For example, in their 
comparative study between France and South Korea, Yoo and Lee (2009) identify 
high levels of interconnectedness between state officials and the corporate sector. 
While this cross-pollination of public and private personnel is not in itself unusual, 
they reveal the influence that governmental agency exerted on business firms in terms 
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of national economic welfare and development. These values became highly 
integrated into the business models of competitive corporations in significant ways. 
Similarly, but with opposite moral outcomes, Frenkel (2001) discovered in his study 
of apparel contractors that were attempting to implement more humanitarian supply 
chains that the state was the main obstacle to this change. Field level pressures from 
governmental agencies – especially hostile to labor unions – ideologically captured 
these firms, making ethical business look less attractive and worthwhile.   
 Secondly, organizations may also be ideologically dominated by the economic 
environment in which they operate, sending important signals regarding how the firm 
ought to manage its internal functions. The increasing financial integration of 
organizations is especially relevant here. Pye (2002) found in a study of 12 large UK 
firms how the shift of power from executive boards to fund managers re-scripted the 
‘sense making’ attributes of organizational members. Short-term shareholder value 
became the dominant ideological purpose of the firm, often at the expense of more 
sustainable business practices. A similar process was noted in Tengblad’s (2004) 
qualitative study of eight CEOs in Sweden. Financial expectations gradually shaped 
the CEOs sense of purpose and these values were then passed down the hierarchy to 
foster conformity among employees. In this way, actors within these organizations 
feel ‘managed by the market’ (Davis, 2009) rather than immediate CEOs. 
 Thirdly, mergers, acquisitions and inter-organizational collaborations can also 
have ‘external control’ effects in organizations, significantly shaping the ideological 
climate of the firm. For example, Vaara and Tienari’s (2011) qualitative investigation 
of a MNC merger reveals how a discursive struggle ensued around the dominant 
cultural tenor of both firms. The more powerful organization deployed a range of 
instruments of symbolic domination to change the ideological values of the weaker 
organization, changing the everyday business practices of its members. A similar 
discursive struggle was observed in consulting projects conducted between firms by 
Levina and Orlikoswi (2009). And Schneper and Gullien’s (2004) quantitative study 
of takeovers in 37 countries also demonstrates, ideology is often central to these 
initiatives. In particular, they found that shareholders often gained the upper hand in 
the firms they studied, especially by lobbying governmental lawmakers to grant them 
more ideological influence over the day-to-day functions of organizations.      
 
4. Domination ‘Against’ Organizations      
 
 Viewing organizations as political systems can also alert researchers to the 
way they may be actively opposed, challenged and resisted by other stakeholder 
groups who seek to undermine their authority, legitimacy and even their existence. 
The critical management studies literature has particularly been attuned to this aspect 
of power and politics (Fleming and Spicer, 2007). As observed in the previous 
sections, contesting the organization frequently occurs through coercion and 
manipulation. However, ideological domination may also play an important role. 
NGOs in the Global South, for example, often seek to challenge both the effectiveness 
and normative legitimacy of status quo business practices to achieve change (see 
Kahn et al., 2007). The objective of these interventions is to ideologically capture the 
organization within its own value system and render them redundant and/or 
undesirable.  
 The rise of new social movements has been a keen focus of research in this 
area. These countervailing organizational forms are especially drawn to ideological 
domination because they are driven by political and moral commitments (McCarthy, 
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Mayer and Zald, 1977; Melucci, 1989). In their analysis of the growth of the ‘slow 
food movement’ in the UK between 1986 and 2010, van Bommel and Spicer (2011) 
present an analysis of domination against the organization. With the rise of 
oligopolistic fast-food chains and supermarket stores, the slow food movement sought 
to challenge the hegemonic status of speed, convenience and ease of access. This in 
turn would replace these values with one’s that were considered more sustainable. 
For van Bommel and Spicer, there are two important dimensions to this form 
resistance, both of which seek to disincentivize the consumer from engaging with 
mainstream food organizations by presenting more environmentally friendly 
alternatives. First of all, the slow food movement did not seek to completely repudiate 
the ideological importance of speed and convenience. Instead, they aimed to redefine 
them in a manner that revealed how they could be achieved outside of the 
corporation’s field. Speed and efficiency are better served without the complex and 
non-transparent commodity chains, which ought to be secondary to price 
considerations. Secondly, the slow movement evoked consumer health as a point of 
contention, ideologically casting large firms as fundamentally antithetical to the 
nutritional needs of everyday citizens.          
Hensman (2003) presents another interesting example of how organizations 
can be ideologically dominated and replaced by alternative institutional forms. This 
study examines the rise of the Internet music industry and the way it culturally 
usurped major entertainment corporations. Organizations like Napster, for example, 
challenged status quo organizations by exploiting the emergence of new technological 
developments. Their ideological campaign was twofold. Firstly, these disruptive 
organizations promoted an alternative that was more aligned with consumer choice. 
Rather than consumer tastes being dictated by impersonal multinational corporations, 
a richer variety of options could be catered to via internet-based broadcasters. 
Secondly, the ease of access that Internet technology allowed meant that consumers 
could enjoy their music instantly. The success of this ideological challenge led to the 
significant decline of traditional entertainment organizations and even the demise of 
some.   
            
Subjectification 
 
 As noted in the earlier sections of this paper, the notion of subjectification 
suggests that power may run deeper than ideology. The concepts of subjectivity, 
identity and selfhood are important in this regard because they allow us to observe the 
way organizational members are regulated through forms of control that become 
inextricably linked to one’s sense of personhood.  
The notion of subjectification is derived from post-structuralism and post-
modernist approaches to power. This research area aims to disrupt traditional 
approaches to the topic in two ways. First of all, what appears to be ostensibly free 
behavior in organizations – namely the lack of coercive, manipulative and ideological 
domination – may in fact have strong power-related qualities. Knights and Willmott 
(1989) call this an analytical transition ‘from degradation to subjugation’. And 
second, the medium that this power functions through has agential qualities that have 
generally been considered somehow outside of political influence (Costea, Crump and 
Amiridis, 2008). This is why identity and selfhood feature so prominently in this 
research. Let us now turn to the way this face of power maps onto the four sites we 
have discussed previously.   
      
 24 
1. Subjectification ‘In’ Organizations 
 
 By far the most studies of this face of power focus on its achievement (and 
resistance) in organizations. This research suggests that this face of power aims to 
constitute or ‘craft’ (Kondo, 1990) identities in organization so that actors manage 
themselves on the behalf of vested interests, often in the name of free self-expression, 
autonomy and career development. Some of the earliest studies of subjection can be 
found in the Critical Labor Process area – especially as it began to turn away from 
Marxian concerns to more Foucauldian concepts.  
In their study of UK banks, Knights and McCabe (1998, 1999) and McCabe 
(2000, 2004) illustrate the way power functions to align employees’ sense of self with 
the changing managerial goals of the firm. Past understandings of selfhood associated 
with an earlier management approach were chastised and became sources of 
existential insecurity, while the new identities promoted by management were 
considered more worthwhile and virtuous. The study is noteworthy since 
subjectification was observed to have a strong emotional and psychodynamic aspect. 
It infiltrates the very heart of the employee and is thus difficult to identify as a form of 
power by those subjected to it (also see Sturdy, 1997; Fineman and Sturdy, 1999; 
Gabriel, 1999).    
 The importance of the Michel Foucault in management studies regarding how 
subjectification functions in organizations must be noted. He argued that disciplinary 
power (Foucault, 1977) and discourse (Foucault, 1982) were central for moving our 
analyses of power beyond the ideology concept, revealing how power reaches into the 
very grain of individuals. A wide range of research has drawn upon these ideas to 
explain the subjectification of organizational actors. As a mode of power, discourse is 
argued to have constructive properties rather than mere representative ones (Hardy 
and Philips, 1999). This approach shifts the focus beyond ideological considerations 
because there is no authentic or true self prior to the appearance of power. As such, 
the power of subjection lies the way it can create discursive or narrative ‘truth effects’ 
that are lived on an everyday subjective basis (Boje, 1995; Riad, 2005).    
For example, Townley (1993) has pointed to the way HRM can become a 
powerful ‘dominant discourse’ through appraisal and performance measures that 
employees absorb as their own. She suggests that employees who feel precarious are 
more likely to feel the need to internalize this discourse in order to appear favorable to 
superiors. Similar results have been noted in relation to the way management 
accounting systems (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998), project management (Hodgson, 
2002; Clegg et al. 2002), diversity (Zanoni and Janssens ( 2004), strategy (Knights 
and Morgan, 1991; Laine and Vaara, 2007) and billable hours (Brown and Lewis, 
2010) can exert a discursive pressures that subjectify subordinates in this manner. 
 According to Foucault (1977), disciplinary power often regulates social actors 
through self-regulation – whereby we literally embody the directives of the 
organization and enforce it upon our identities, aspirations and relations with others. 
This has made the topic of self-disciplining identities an important focus in this area 
of research. Alvesson and Willmott (2002) refer to ‘identity work’ to capture this 
element of disciplinary power. They found in their study that identity regulation in the 
workplace revolves around an ideal employee self. This prompts self-management 
among organizational members, which reconstructs employee subjectivity in certain 
ways (also see Karreman and Alvesson, 2001). As Kenny (2012) also argues, this 
may be exacerbated by a need for recognition among the workforce, especially when 
they feel vulnerable to shifting political alliances within the firm. This finding is 
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supported by Thornborrow and Brown’s (2009) fascinating analysis of disciplinary 
power in a paratrooper regiment. The ideal-self promoted by the regiment was almost 
impossible to achieve, and in failing to do so the regiment effectively disciplined 
themselves in significant ways (also see Brown and Coupland, 2005; Brown, 
Kornberger, Clegg and Carter, 2010).  
 Other studies have focused on the organizational technologies, teamwork and 
infrastructure that may promote such self-disciplining identities. Electronic 
surveillance is particularly salient in this research. Sewell and Wilkinson (1992) 
provide a classic analysis of subjectification in their study of a firm implementing 
TQM and teamwork. The electronics factory utilized peer pressure and visible 
performance indicators to discipline it workers, resulting in workers feeling 
inadequate about themselves as they embodied the regime within their sense of 
identity (also see Casey, 1995; Barker, 1993). Because the spatial arrangement of the 
plant resembled a ‘panopticon’, the managerial gaze was always present among 
employees, to the extent where they enacted its influence upon themselves and fellow 
workers (also see Halford and Leonard, 2006).  
Knights and Murray’s (1992) investigation of an insurance firm introducing 
new information systems similarly demonstrates how the new climate of 
‘transparency’ substantially changed the way workers understood themselves and 
their roles, revealing the insidious social power of technology when enacted within 
certain political settings (also see Ball and Wilson, 2000; Coombs et al. 2002; 
Bloomfield and Danieli 1995).   
 Subjectification, however, does not go uncontested. It gives rise to its own set 
of political struggles within organizations. For example, Alvesson and Willmott 
(2002) found in their study of identity regulation in organizations that employees 
drew upon other notions of self – especially those related to non-work – to resist 
subjectification. In a related investigation, Dick and Cassells (2002) observed 
organizational actors constructing counter-discourses to create a mental space to 
avoid complete subjectification in their study of police officers in the UK. And 
Thomas and Davies’s (2005) analysis of New Public Management in the UK also 
found a raft of ‘micro-political’ practices in which employee’s contested 
subjectification through alternative understandings of collective selfhood.                
 
2. Subjectification ‘Through’ Organization 
 
 Now we turn to how organizations themselves may utilize the power of 
subjectification to enact changes in its broader institutional field. With respect to this 
site of subjectification, we differentiate it from coercion, manipulation and ideological 
domination in a number of ways. First, this mode of power seeks to change a 
particular organizational field by reconstituting the identities of other actors, using the 
focal organization to do so. Second, this implies some kind of ‘activism’ since the 
focal organization aims to persuade other institutional actors to adopt a subjective 
position that may be significantly different to the one they currently occupy. Different 
ways of being in relation to a particular ‘topic’ or ‘issue’ are especially salient in this 
research. And third, subjectification through organization requires certain 
maintenance protocols to keep the pressure on and avoid institutional reversals.  
Moreover, these elements of subjectification thus differentiate it from those 
practices we noted in the previous section regarding processes ‘in’ organizations. This 
is because external actors have more choice and autonomy to refuse subjectification 
than those dependent upon the organization for employment. Accordingly, the 
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emphasis is less on Foucauldian themes such as ‘self-discipline’ and identity-
regulation and more on discursive construction, active persuasion and overt 
politicking. For example, Hardy and Philips (1999) argue in their study of refugee and 
immigrant rights groups in Canada that “organizations often engage in discursive 
struggle as they attempt to shape and manage the institutional field of which they are 
a part” (1999: 1). Like other studies of this type, the emphasis is on how subjective 
meaning (in this case, the idea of the ‘refugee’) is actively managed by discourses, 
which in turn are deployed by organizations to change the way actors identify with 
certain issues.  
A number of key studies have revealed the processes and complexities 
involved in subjectification through organizations. In their study of attempts to 
change attitudes about forced marriage in the UK, Goss, Jones, Latham and Betta 
(2011) argue that ‘emancipatory entrepreneurship’ was indispensable to the way 
oppositional movements installed a different sense of self towards forced marriage. 
To demonstrate why, they use the atypical methodology of an autobiographical 
narrative, Shame (2007), by the activist Jasvinder Sanghera. Goss et al. (2011) 
suggest that Sanghera used the anti-forced-marriage movement to mobilize a wide 
range of alternative identities or ‘subject positions’ that members of the relevant 
community might occupy. This allowed the male community to detach themselves 
from the stereotypical identities that sanctioned coerced wedlock and thus approach 
the issue from more liberating perspectives.  
Following Goss et al., three process of subjectification are particularly useful 
for the purposes of our paper. Firstly, tactics of subjectification focused on ‘micro-
processes’ of power within the community. This means that identity is not something 
that ‘floats’ in an acontextual way, but fundamentally linked to what Goss et al. call 
rituals of power: everyday activities underlying the maintenance of identities that 
accept forced marriage. Secondly, these rituals have a very strong emotional 
component, a feature that Sanghera as an emancipatory entrepreneur used to rescript 
understandings of females as free agents. And third, the process of subjectification is 
ongoing and require ‘institutional work’ in order to perpetuate an identity that found 
force marriage ‘shameful’ among the male population.    
 Benjamin and Goclaw (2005) provide another example of how organizations 
utilize subjectification to change broader institutional fields. They investigated how 
professional associations in Israel – specializing in human resource and personnel 
management – changed the industry-wide perception that non-standard employment 
(NSE) results in organizational inefficiencies. Using critical discourse analysis, 
Benjamin and Goclaw suggest that active lobbying and discursive persuasion was 
central to discrediting the idea among managers that NSE was unfair and bad for 
business. This change was brought about by reorientating the subjective connotations 
(especially for themselves) that NSE practices signified for human resource managers. 
Important to this discursive realignment was to have managers approach the subject 
as “a gesture of concern for employees in non-standard arrangements” (Benjamin and 
Goclaw, 2005: 737).  
 Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) present another interesting case of 
subjectification through organizations. They investigated the discursive contestation 
that ensued when a Big Five accounting firm purchased a law enterprise, and thus 
establishing a multidisciplinary partnership. Professional law bodies fiercely 
contested the initiative. According to Suddaby and Greenwood, profound institutional 
change occurred through the use of a new rhetoric concerning the legitimacy of the 
project. This shifted the field in a manner that allowed actors to subjectively identify 
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with the new multidisciplinary form. Crucial to this subjective realignment was the 
use of rhetoric that provided new spaces for an identity comfortable with the 
accounting/law partnership. Expertise was particularly important for this industry-
wide change in actor perceptions of legitimacy.      
 
3. Subjectification ‘Over’ Organizations 
 
 We now take the perspective of a focal organization being influenced by the 
broader field of institutions and how subjectification ‘over’ this organization may 
occur. As with the previous sections dealing with this site of power, studies have 
identified a range of influences, pressures and forces that can stem from the 
environment to change the way organizations operate. This perspective shift is 
noteworthy since it does not focus so much on how actors may seek to change others 
(related to power ‘in’ and ‘through’ organizations) but instead the way external 
change agents can instigate subjective and identity-related permutations that 
reorientate how organizational members manage themselves. 
   Most of the research dealing with subjectification ‘over’ organizations tends 
to study governmental influence on the focal organization. This could be for a number 
of reasons. First, it might be argued that subjectifying power frequently relies on a 
coercive backdrop in order to function. For example, in our above discussion of 
subjectification ‘in’ organizations, we noted that it is probably due to the deep 
dependency that members have in the firm that accounts for their willingness to 
participate in subjectifying power relations (Fleming, 2014). In this sense, 
governments lay down the ‘rules of the game’ that all societal institutions must abide 
by. Second, the neoliberal reforms that many governments have promoted over the 
last 20 years have seen traditional organizational forms – schools, public service 
agencies and so-forth – being fundamentally restructured (Friedland and Alford, 
1991). A major part of this process involved subjectification.  
 A good example of this site of subjectification (and the resistance it may 
provoke) can be found in Spicer and Sewell’s (2010) investigation of the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), a public media organization. They chart the 
governmental attempt to shift the internal structures of the organization towards more 
market-based principles over a 40-year period. In the final phase of the reform it was 
the very ethos and identities of its employees that was targeted by power. The public 
media provider was to become more enterprising, capitalistic and economically 
focused in its approach to the media. Coercion, manipulation and ideological 
domination were all present here, of course. However, this study is particular attuned 
to the attempts to have ABC employees subjectively and even existentially identify 
with the values of profit-maximization. Much protest resulted, with some journalists 
seeking to encourage traditional media ethics among the public (including 
associations such as ‘Friends of the ABC’). Despite this resistance, the new 
commercial ethic was ultimately established. 
 In another Australian study focusing on subjectification ‘over’ organization, 
Brown et al. (2012) conducted an analysis of the discursive realignment of identity 
around aged-care. A governmental review of aged-care sought to redefine the 
meaning and connotations of age with respect to the elderly and young. Rather than 
frailty, for example, being the key signifier of the aged, the review sought to recast 
service users in more economic terms, based upon independence and self-
management. It is interesting to note that care providers themselves were the main 
target of this discourse and its subjectifying effects. Caregivers were no longer social 
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good providers but the enterprising managers of a commercial commodity. In this 
respect, power became deeply embedded in the very identities of these occupational 
groups.  
 A number of other studies have focused on the reform of public institutions 
from the perspective of subjectification. For example, Oakes et al. (1998) investigated 
the introduction of ‘business planning’ models in a number of Canadian museums. 
The authors demonstrate how this entailed a fundamental discursive realignment of 
how employees identified with their roles. Prior to the initiative workers valued each 
other for their ‘cultural capital’. Consequently, however, they perceived themselves as 
‘entrepreneurs’ whose mission was to add economic value. A similar study was 
conducted by Ezzamel (1994) in relation to the imposition of accounting 
methodologies in a UK university. The transparency provided by the new program 
subjectified actors by creating ‘truth effects’ around the economic viability of the 
organization. As a result, the accounting mentality was deeply inscribed into the 
everyday identity work of employees, reshaping their very sense of self in terms of 
commercialism and potentially expendable human resources.      
 The cultural dynamics of post-merger organizational relations have been the 
topic of numerous studies, as noted in the sections above. Subectification ‘over’ 
organizations as a site of power might be useful for understanding this phenomenon 
too. For example, Clark and Geppert (2011) emphasize this form of power in their 
investigation of the way a post-Soviet organization merged into a Western MNC 
context. Given the divergence of cultural values between the two organizations, the 
researcher’s note how a new set of ‘sense making’ protocols were produced in order 
for Western commercial values to become internalized by employees. This occurred 
to such an extent that workers found that their basic identities as social subjects were 
fundamentally reshaped.     
  
4. Subjectification ‘Against’ Organizations 
      
 The final site of subjectification pertains to those processes used to function 
‘against’ organizations. This site of power differs from coercion, manipulation and 
domination since power seeks to recast organizational members in a manner that 
essentially changes their self-identity rather than the structural and ideological milieu. 
According to our review of the management and organization science literature, this 
site of power has received less attention. This could be for a number of reasons. First, 
actors seeking to resist or oppose dominant organizations have little technical access 
to the flows of identity within the firm. This is perhaps why coercion, manipulation 
and ideological domination (especially through social movements) are considered 
more favorable modes of contestation. Secondly, as we noted above, subjectification 
requires a strong institutional background – formal or legitimate authority, for 
example – to take hold. Therefore, subjectification is probably the last in a sequence 
of actions used to capture the organization. In this respect, its empirical enactment is 
perhaps overshadowed by preceding moments of power and politics.  
   The research we have found dealing with this site of subjectification 
generally focuses on employee oppositional movements to a focal organizational. 
This is especially so in relation to worker initiatives seeking to take over the 
management of the institution in question. According to Adler’s (2001) excellent 
analysis of ‘trust’ in post-Fordist knowledge firms, contemporary organizations have 
become so reliant on anti-hierarchical flows of cooperation, that work processes have 
begun to outpace traditional power relations related to the capitalist 
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employer/employee relationship. This may have laid the foundations for ‘post-
capitalist’ ideas among the workforce. This development noted by Adler (2001) may 
explain the rationale behind employee attempts to formally valorize their latent 
autonomy and self-management abilities, redefining the social meaning of work 
organizations in the process. 
Given the deeply entrenched status of capitalist power relations, employee 
takeovers require more than coercion, manipulation and domination. An elementary 
alteration in what being a ‘worker’ means is also necessary. This is where 
subjectification plays an important role. Examples of this in management and 
organizational science can be found in investigations of employee-led takeovers of 
organizations. Hammer and Stern (1980) studied an employee buyout of a furniture 
factory and the ensuing power struggles that followed. The major obstacle for unions 
was to convince not only industry leaders but also its own employee membership that 
this could be a successful venture. This was done by promoting an alternative self-
identity among workers, especially in relation to the virtues of self-management and 
autonomy (also see Harrison (1994).      
 One interesting tactic used by employees to enact subjectification ‘over’ 
organizations is the use of rhetoric already promoted by dominant management 
discourses. Again, this resonates with Adler’s (2001) observation that because self-
management and autonomy are the basis of much value-adding activities in post-
Fordist firms, the possibility of their full realization has become an important 
leveraging moment in organizational politics. McCabe (2009) noted this in his study 
of a UK bank. Employees turned the discursive idealization of self-regulation against 
the firm to again fuller control over it. In this sense, they over-identified with their 
own subjectification as self-regulating actors, and thus told top-management that if 
they were to authentically embody the prescribed identity of ‘responsible subjects’ 
they would have to be fundamentally involved in the day-today operation of the bank 
(also see Fleming and Spicer, 2003). While this did not result in a complete employee 
takeover, it did partially ‘resubjectify’ the organization to create a new discursive 
institutional climate (also see Sutherland, Land and Bohm, 2013).  
 Meyer and Scully’s (1995) fascinating analysis of ‘tempered radicals’ extends 
our understanding of these counter-subjectifying tactics in organizations. These 
individuals slowly and patiently change the way leaders understand themselves in 
relation to important social justice issues within the firm. As such, tempered radicals 
do not attempt to take complete power or overtly revolt against the status quo. 
Instead, they change the building-blocks of identity by raising obvious injustices from 
within, hoping to make deep subjective connections between powerful decision-
makers and a legitimate political cause (e.g., gender inequality, homophobia, violence 
and environmental degradation). Often times these issues are already prominent 
within the broader political landscape and are translated into everyday politics within 
the firm by conscious objectors. Following the internal politicking of the tempered 
radical, a leader might ask themselves: ‘am I the kind of person who would represent 
an institution that condones and perpetuates such injustices?’        
         
Evaluation and Future Areas of Research 
 
We often think of organizational power as the enactment of direct force by an 
actor over others. However, as our review reveals, power is not only exercised 
through highly visible acts of direction or even back room politicking. It also infuses 
many of the systems, processes, ideas and even identities that organizations 
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constitute. Moreover, the research we have reviewed emphasizes the point that the 
politics of organizational life goes far beyond the boardroom. We have seen that 
political dynamics associated with power can develop in the most unlikely crevices of 
the organization. They can be found on the shop floor, in the cramped offices of 
middle managers and in the high-level interactions between senior executives and 
governments. Moreover, the rise of new social movements around an array of issues 
directly concerning organizations has placed the question of power at the heart of 
important debates occurring in many societies today. This is especially so given the 
veritable explosion of alternative social media formats. All of this tells us that 
organizational power is not just multidimensional, but also multi-sited and 
increasingly contested.  
In the discussion section we seek to build on these insights in order to identify 
some novel trajectories for future research. In order to do this we will identify four 
areas where we think novel research questions may lie: (1) overarching points of 
agreement in the literature which might be problematized, (2) ongoing tensions or 
points of debate which may prompt further inquiry, (3) emerging issues which we 
have noted in recent studies but require further research and (4) neglected issues that 
may offer opportunities for future exploration. In each of these sections, we will draw 
out a set of potential future research questions that might be asked in order to move 




As noted in the previous section, the literature on power is broad and touches 
on a wide variety of different phenomena. It also uses very different sources of 
theoretical inspiration to understand these disparate phenomena. But in spite of this 
significant diversity, there appear to be some important commonalities that cut across 
the literature. Four notable assumptions we would like to discuss are that power (1) is 
largely informal in organizations, (2) structured around uncertainty, (3) impersonal, 
and (4) requires some degree of meaning or justification.  
Instead of treating these assumptions as a point of positive knowledge, we will 
seek to problematize (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011) these broad points of agreement. 
This involves critically analyzing the agreed assumptions and in some cases reversing 
them. By doing this, it is possible to generate novel research questions for future 
research. 
The first crosscutting assumption appears to be that organizational power 
largely operates in an informal manner (e.g., Mechanic, 1962). Much of the research 
points out that only focusing on formal positions of power can blind us to the central 
dynamics through which power actually functions. These dynamics include the 
control of organizational specific resources (Salanick and Pfeffer, 1974), the 
development of social networks (Brass, 1990) and the ability to use language in a 
persuasive fashion (Brown, 1978). In order to study power, we must look beyond the 
position and register less visible aspects of political life. This is why, we suggest, a 
sometimes-heated struggle that can flare up around what often seem like insignificant 
issues. For instance, think of redistribution of office space and the vicious political 
contestation this can inspire. Such struggles are due to the fact that what is at stake is 
not just a workspace, but resonate with broader aspects of symbolic power, one’s 
position in a social network and one’s sense of self (Taylor and Spicer, 2007).  
The assumption that power works through informal mechanisms is 
widespread, but it may be questioned. For example, we might identify cases where 
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informal power relations do not matter and whether they are simply a distraction from 
the real political action in an organization. Asking such a question might yield some 
interesting insights into how the attention of actors is directed to particular avenues 
that may prove to be important or otherwise. In addition, we might ask why 
organizations tend to cling to positions of formal authority – often with great fervor – 
given its secondary status in getting things done. This is strange if informal power 
relations are the most important aspect of organizational life. Perhaps formal positions 
of authority are not just an expression of power, but more related to other issues 
including organizational ethics or codes of justice (Du Gay, 2000). 
This tension between formality/informality is played out most conspicuously 
among new social movements and their attempts to change the status quo in and 
around organizations. As many of the studies we have discussed in this paper contend, 
these collective movements are often born from dissatisfaction with formal 
institutional forums because certain concerns remain unvoiced (McCarthy, Mayer and 
Zald, 1977; Melucci, 1989). However, as they gain legitimacy and are included in 
more traditional decision-making settings, they assume formalized qualities, some of 
which are contested by the social movement themselves because it is deemed to 
compromise their effectiveness (e.g., see Crane and Matten’s [2012] discussion of 
Greenpeace). This dynamic alerts us to the ambivalent question of whether power is 
most effectively enacted through formal or informal social structures and enactments.      
The second assumption cutting across this research is that power is structured 
around uncertainty or the ability to control uncertainty (Hickson et al, 1971). Those 
actors are powerful who can control uncertainty using a range of mechanisms 
including scarce resources, networks, ideologies and identities. By managing 
uncertainty, it is possible to assuage anxieties triggered by not knowing exactly what 
an outcome might be. In the review section, we discussed a classic statement of this in 
a study conducted by Crozier (1964). He found that the ability to reduce uncertainty 
through specialist skills was central in a tobacco factory. This insight has been carried 
into studies on resource dependency that explain why resources are the central 
mechanism through which ambiguity is managed in organizations. More subtle forms 
of power such as ideology and the construction of subjective identity may also be a 
mechanism for reducing uncertainty and the anxiety which comes with it (Knights 
and Willmott, 1989). Undergirding this argument is the assumption that organizations 
as whole tend to abhor uncertainty, which means they require processes for banishing 
it. Power is one of the most important ways they do this.   
Some novel problems appear when we question this assumption. Rather than 
providing certainty in an uncertain world, perhaps power may enact the opposite 
outcome. In other words, power might create a sense of uncertainty in a world that is 
actually relatively unambiguous and systematic. Powerful actors may actively foster 
uncertainties in the allocation of resources, social networks, ideologies and identities 
(Jauch and Kraft, 1986). For example, managers may gain influence by creating deep 
uncertainty around the distribution of resources, employment relationships, decision-
making criteria and social identities (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2006). Examining the 
power of ambiguity ‘in’, ‘though’, ‘over’ and ‘against’ organizations may yield of 
some potentially surprising insights.  
The third assumption in much of the literature points to the fact that 
organizational power is often impersonal. That is to say, power is typically not seen as 
a property of an individual, but somehow operates ‘through’ people (Clegg, 1989). 
For example, actors gain power by being in a fortuitous position in a social network 
(e.g. Burt, 1992) or using a particular discourse rather than being powerful in and of 
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themselves (Mumby, 1988). This in turn implies that it is possible to abstract power 
from particular individuals and identify how it functions through particular situations 
and events. In this sense, power becomes something curiously disembodied. 
Following this, it has become fashionable for researchers to largely focus on how 
power plays out through relatively abstract categories and positions rather than 
concrete acts and bodies.  
This assumption may be problematized by demonstrating how power is often 
not experienced as an abstract process but deeply embodied in a particular person or 
event (Styhre, 2004). The research on ideological domination and subjectification, for 
example, frequently misses this because it reduces power to an abstract category that 
is removed from existential corporeality and lived experience. How might we bring 
concrete individuals back into the research agenda concerning organizational power? 
Perhaps researchers might follow Elias Canetti’s (1962) suggestion that the clenched 
fist or tense shoulder muscle is often the root expression of power. This would allow 
us to inquire about the ways power is expressed, felt and made personal through 
bodies. Moreover, this would shift our attention to the toll that expressions of power 
can take on the body, and how bodies get disciplined into regimes of power (e.g., 
Michel, 2011)   
The final widely held assumption is that organizational power generally 
appears when there is some kind of indeterminacy and agency (Arendt, 1958). That is 
to say, power tends to function in contexts where there is the possibility an actor may 
not follow the demands the powerful place on them. The classic expression of such 
indeterminacy can be found in labor process theory whereby power is enacted by 
employers because they are uncertain what contracted employees will actually do 
with their time (Braverman, 1974). For example, ideological forms of control in the 
workplace are used to make employees actually want to align their goals and actions 
with those of their employers (Burawoy, 1979). This assumption has led to a rich 
tradition of research that examines how dominant groups seek to reduce 
indeterminacy and narrow the range of possible activities that actors might undertake 
(O’Doherty and Willmott, 2001).  
To generate a new research trajectory, it might be possible to problematize this 
assumption. Power may actually be used to create and promote indeterminacy. 
Research has shown how some organizations have employed ‘neo-normative’ 
controls in which difference, diversity and non-standardization are central in the 
production process (Fleming and Sturdy, 2009; Fleming, 2014). Managers do not 
determine the labor process but actively encouraged open indeterminacy regarding 
when, where, and how tasks were performed. Ressler and Thompson (2011) call this a 
‘results only’ management philosophy because it focuses only on outputs, leaving the 
responsibility for inputs to the employee. Such indeterminacy actually enhances 
productivity rather than undermine it. Further investigation into this type of power 
might open up new vistas about how we understand control and influence in 





In addition to these crosscutting agreements, there are also a number of 
striking contentions that define this research area. Indeed, Lukes (1974) suggestion 
that power is an ‘essentially contested concept’ still holds true. The very nature of the 
subject matter leads to very different assumptions about how power functions. This 
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perhaps makes it is difficult, if not impossible, to settle disagreements through the 
collection of additional evidence or by creating some kind of meta-theoretical 
framework.  
There are four particular points of contention that we would like to examine in 
more depth. These are disagreements about (1) how power functions (whether it 
operates in an episodic or systemic fashion), (2) who exercises power in organizations 
(whether it is largely managerial or whether a range of stakeholders have power), (3) 
what the effects of organizational power are (whether they are repressive or 
productive), (4) and how power might be studied (whether it should be examined 
directly or indirectly). 
The first contention concerns exactly how power functions. For some 
researchers, power is enacted through definable acts. These might include issuing 
orders, directing funds or engaging in subtle backroom dealings. They are clearly acts 
that one can identify clearly. For others, power is seen as a property of the systemic 
environment itself. To understand power, therefore, it is not sufficient to examine how 
it operates through specific and definable acts. Instead, power can only be studied by 
focusing on social systems.  
These two approaches are based upon different sets of assumptions. Those 
focusing on more episodical approaches to power look for observable actions. A more 
systematic approach examines the broader social structure as influence is mobilized. 
In this article we have tried to deal with this problem by highlighting how episodic 
and systemic dynamics can be considered as two dimensions of the broader construct 
of power (see also Lawrence et al, 2012). If we are correct, it then becomes an 
empirical question as to why one dimension might dominate and others not. For 
example, are there particular kinds of work or organizations that are more likely to 
use systemic power and others that make episodic forms of domination more 
probable?  
The second tension concerns the problem of who mobilizes power. For 
obvious reasons many researchers focus on managers as the major merchants of 
power in organizations. Of particular interest is high-level staff such as CEOs 
(Hambrick, 2007). Another group of studies has approached power as something 
more dispersed, mobilized by a wide range of stakeholders (Zald, 1970). This might 
include workers, communities, members of the supply chain, social movements and 
so-forth. These two different analytical focuses often lead to very different political 
maps emerge regarding organizational life. For the first political map, all roads lead to 
central managers such as CEOs. The second map presents a far more diffuse and 
complicated image of how organizations operate.  
Although the kind of map of power that researchers use may be quite different 
depending on their perspective, we think that there are some interesting empirical 
questions that might be suggested by the divergence. In particular, we could ask how 
different sets of actors are empowered or disempowered overtime. Are there 
particular situations that allow managerial actors to gain more power than others? 
This contingent and longitudinal approach may allow researchers to explore whether 
we have witnessed the increased empowerment of managerial actors in organizations 
or whether other actors (such as financiers, social movements, governments, highly 
skilled employees) have gained more power overtime.  
Furthermore, we might inquire about how these patterns of empowerment and 
disempowerment are distributed in organizations. Why do particular actors such as 
managers become increasingly empowered within an organization while other actors 
find their powers fading away? And what are the potentially effects of these 
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differential distributions of power? Does the empowerment of a certain group of 
actors – such as shareholders - lead to distinctive outcomes in relation to the 
redistribution of resources or changing identities?  
A third major contention concerns the precise outcomes of power (see 
McCabe, 2000). Some claim that power is largely repressive in nature and tends to 
constrain activities in an organization (Braverman, 1974). For others, power is 
considered to be largely productive (Townley, 1993). It is a process that constructs 
subject positions as well as processes and agendas. Both perspectives lead to very 
different analytical concerns. Researchers building on a repressive approach to power 
identify how behavior is restricted and contained. Those who are interested in 
productive approaches focus on how power constructs various aspects of 
organizational reality related to truth claims and subject positions. Power enables 
action.  
At first glance these assumptions seem diametrically opposed. However, we 
think it may prove fruitful to avoid treating these two approaches as simply an 
analytical choice, but an opportunity for further exploration. For example, it might be 
possible to blend these two concepts to create novel areas of research related to 
‘productive repression’. This would entail identifying forms of repression that 
actually create selves, objects and empowerment. Highly repressive forms of power 
that prohibit individuals from doing certain things can actually function to create 
certain enabling positions. It also might be possible to explore modes of power that 
take the form of ‘repressive production’. This would direct us to activities that 
underscore the production and reproduction of repressive regimes.  
The final major contention that characterizes the literature concerns the 
problem of how we empirically measure power (see Clegg, 1989). For some, power 
can be measured and mapped directly by observing what actors concretely do (Kuhn, 
2008). For others, power cannot be observed directly. It needs to be identified through 
outcomes such as perceptions of being powerful (e.g., Gioia and Sims, 1983). Each 
methodological assumption can lead researchers to different research approaches. 
Those who assume that power can be measured directly deploy indicators, metrics 
and direct observation. The second perspective uses broader types of empirical 
observation and make inferences from a wide range of outcomes that may not first 
appear to be related to organizational power and politics. 
While these two perspectives have prompted the use of different 
methodological tools, it may be possible to generate some methodological innovations 
by approaching the question in a less didactic fashion. For example, researchers may 
blend these methodologies to inquire why some aspects of power are more or less 
easily observable. Are there types of power more amenable to observational or 
quantitative methods? And might inference based research inspire new empirical 
questions about the social conditions that allow for more directly quantifiable 
activities to be present in an organization? Finally, it is important to inquire about the 
processes through which otherwise observable enactments of power come to be made 
unobservable. And conversely, how and why do previously hidden and unobservable 
aspects of power suddenly become observable. 
 
Emerging Research Concerns  
 
We suggest that there are a number of exciting concerns emerging from 
organizational power research that may prompt future research activities. We are 
mindful that it is often novel empirical phenomena that provide the grist for the mill 
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for the development of novel theory (Corley and Gioia, 2011). This is particularly true 
when existing theories do not adequately explain new phenomena. To identify these 
new issues, we have sought to highlight topics of broader public contention that have 
a limited but growing body of research associated with them. These are (1) elites, (2) 
collective action, (3) how corporations seek to shape society, and (4) the role of the 
state in influencing organizational power relations.  
Before examining these themes, we should note that each area is not strictly 
novel. Some may even observe that these topics have a somewhat ‘retro’ tone about 
them. However, we argue that the focus on largely fluid and fragmented power 
relationships found in much organizational research over the last two decades has 
largely obscured these more traditional and deeply institutionalized modes of power. 
We now know much about the way power operates in fleeting situations where actors 
often have a significant degree of autonomy. However, our knowledge of how power 
functions through stronger and more difficult to manipulate apparatuses such as the 
state has not kept pace with emergent social trends. These institutionalized modes of 
power have not disappeared with the advent of ‘postindustrial society’. Indeed, it 
might be argued that these constellations of power have actually become even more 
oppressive in recent years.  
The first emergent theme that is noteworthy concerns elites. This involves the 
study of groups of very powerful people who often transcend the boundaries of 
individual organizations. The study of elites was a foundational concern in many 
studies of power (e.g., Mills, 1956; Zeitlin, 1974). However, this topic has largely 
been abandoned in favor of identifying more fluid and democratic power relations 
under the influence of Robert Dahl (1957) and his followers. Only recently have we 
seen the theme of elites returning in organizational research (e.g., Zald and 
Lounsbury, 2010). The increasing dissolution of corporate hierarchies and the rising 
importance of small groups that wield massive economic power make the study of 
elites increasingly important today.  
Future research might inquire about why elite networks have gained increased 
control over corporations (see Mizruchi and Yoo, 2002), and how these groups are 
becoming increasingly transnational in scope (Ker and Robinson, 2012). We think a 
particularly interesting question is precisely how elite networks are spreading their 
control across different types of organizations and whether there is some kind of 
circulation of elites among NGOs, governments and the corporation. Moreover, what 
types of elite are important in this regard? We suggest attention ought to be focused 
on iconic elite organizations like top strategy consultancies, think tanks and 
investment banks that actively seek to control the broader polity to further their 
interests. 
The second emerging theme in the literature concerns the role of collective 
action. This research asks how people come together to exercise power and in some 
cases change its traditional distribution. Once again, there is a long tradition of 
research on collective action that has many overlaps with organization theory (e.g., 
Davis et al., 2005). But these investigations have tended to focus on the role of 
collective action against organizations. We feel this theme could be further explored 
in relation to power within organizations, over organizations and through 
organizations.  
Examining collective action ‘in’ organizations, for example, would enable 
researchers to understand how power is mobilized by various groups who come 
together to form intra-organizational movements. This would highlight issues such 
gender and racial discrimination, corporate social responsibility and new management 
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ideas that are actively championed within organizations through the formation of 
social movements. A focus on collective action might also help us appreciate the way 
groups seek to gain power ‘through’ organizations. For example, such research would 
further investigate how these collective agents establish their power through founding 
specialist bodies that represent their interests. It might also be possible to consider 
how collective action is used by various coalitions to gain power ‘over’ organizations. 
For example, it may be possible to trace how managerial groups, professions and 
other types of cohorts have sort to establish their influence over organizations – or 
indeed whole sets of organizations.  
The third theme that we find very promising for future research involves 
exploring the increasing power of certain organizational forms, especially the private 
corporation. Recent investigations have pointed to how corporations have becoming 
very powerful actors that inordinately shape societal processes beyond their formal 
remit (e.g., Barley, 2010). Why and how is it that large institutions, and in particular 
corporations, have been able to establish and extend their own power within society? 
This question opens up some fascinating issues about the way corporations have 
politically maneuvered to capture broader socio-economic sectors to serve their 
interests. Future research might also explore this topic in relation to education, 
healthcare, religion and family relationships. And how do these corporate institutions 
interact with another growing power base related to financialization – especially 
hedge funds and private equity firms?   
The final emerging theme is the role of deeply institutionalized forms of 
power in shaping the distribution and dynamics of power in organizations. Typically 
we have assumed that existing institutionalized forms of power such as the state and 
the family have been in decline in comparison to the modern organization. However, 
we propose that these power arrangements have actually remained and in some cases 
increased. This is certainly the case with the state. In recent years, there has been an 
assumption that state power has been relaxed in liberal societies. However, recent 
revelations about the extent of state spying and surveillance suggest this is not so. The 
state seems to frequently operate hand-in-hand with organizations to enforce broader 
power relations. Often business corporations or indeed other kinds of organizations 
find themselves servants of state power. This is particularly obvious in non-liberal 
countries like China and Russia. Much future research can be done in this area to 
examine the power of the state and how it operates in tandem with or against business 
corporations in particular. 
 
Overlooked Issues  
 
Based upon our review of the management and organization studies literature 
regarding power, we identified a number of themes that appear to have been omitted 
and overlooked. These neglected issues provide significant opportunities for future 
theory building to help us understand emerging modes of power and also develop 
existing conceptualizations. Although there is a wide range of issues that could 
potentially be singled out for attention, we feel four topics are surprisingly absent in 
current research.  
The first concerns the almost entirely unreported connection between 
organizational power and violence. We suggest that in some circumstances, violence 
or the threat of violence may be deeply connected with current organizational power 
relationships. For example, there is clearly ‘rogue’ instances violence in the 
workplace – which include everything from unsanctioned bullying to accidents to 
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random workplace murders. How ought we understand these phenomena in relation to 
current theories of power? Additionally, many forms of organizational power are 
underscored by the threat or expectation of such violence. Acts of ‘random violence’ 
are used to justify and drive extensive forms of official control such as surveillance 
systems. In this sense, studying how this ‘threat’ is used by organizations might be 
instructive insofar as it would demonstrate how violence is often met with the 
continuation and increased intensity of organizational sanctioned power relations.  
The study of organizational violence might be informative in other ways. For 
example, the selective use of violence or its threat is often an important way in which 
power functions under normal circumstances. The power of the state often rests – at 
least in last resort – on their legitimate recourse to physical force (Giddens, 1985). 
Although the state is a special case, violence may play a role in many organizations 
settings, including the military most obviously. Moreover, institutionalized violence 
may operate through collective bonds outside of official power relations. 
Organizations like the military, factories, sports clubs and boarding schools use 
‘hazing’ and beatings to initiate newcomers and create feelings of fraternity and 
honor. While clearly physical, such violence also plays an important symbolic role 
too (Bourdieu, 1991).  
The second unexplored topic is the persistent presence of traditional patterns 
of authority in shaping organizational power relations. Much of the existing literature 
begins with the Weberian assumption that modern authority and (sometimes 
charismatic authority) is the key to understanding power relations in contemporary 
organizations. However, traditional forms of authority such as family relations and 
religion are often ignored as an ongoing regulative force. Thus, we miss the 
importance of family businesses or religious organizations. Moreover, there are many 
cases in which these traditional forms of authority subtly interweave with formal 
organizational power relations. For example, a number of large organizations still 
reply upon religious denomination in recruitment decisions. Similarly, kinship or 
kinship-like groups are often vital in shaping the distribution of power within or even 
between organizations (Jackall, 1988). Further research needs to be conducted to 
clarify how these more established forms of authority interlink, overlap and in some 
cases contrast with modern forms of authority.  
The third area of neglect concerns the way institutional theory – and especially 
the very popular area of ‘institutional logics’ – appears to have downplayed the role 
of power in organizations. It is surprising that the founding insights of Friedland and 
Alford (1991) – which are deeply political and attuned to power relationships 
stemming from class and corporate domination – have significantly receded in much 
of the subsequent research concerning institutional logics. Following Thornton and 
Ocasio (1999), Lounsbury (2007), Greenwood et al (2010) and Thornoton et al (2012) 
we suggest that this area of inquiry would massively benefit by placing power at the 
heart of the analysis once again. This is especially so in relation to the cultural 
contingency of power relations within institution building settings.  
The fourth and final neglected issue that the management and organization 
science may benefit from concerns the role of non-functional power relations. Much 
of the literature that we have reviewed tends to assume that power has some practical 
function. Power is usually studied when it seeks to achieve a definable objective 
(Ocasio, 2002). However, power relations may frequently be quite dysfunction insofar 
as they do not do what they are supposed to (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012). The hording 
of resources may fail to shore-up the power of the hoarder. Schemes of ideological 
control may not lead employees to change their belief systems. Attempts to 
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manipulate employee’s subjectivity may create alienation rather than increased 
commitment.  
Indeed, we were surprised by the dearth of research concerning the way power 
may be exercised not to achieve any given goal but simply for its own sake. Many 
workers have reported examples where the exercise of power seems surplus or 
redundant to important functional requirements (Fleming and Spicer, 2007). In these 
instances, power may be more about gratuitous symbolic displays than seeking to 
achieve functional outcomes. Here power ensures that actors actually do not get 
things done. This presents an interesting research trajectory whereby we study non-
functional power relations that are in some ways surplus to requirements. This would 
entail a careful analysis of what Hebert Marcuse called ‘surplus oppression’ (1955). 
We think that organizations continue to be hot-beds of this ‘surplus oppression’ which 
ranges from overly restrictive systems to petty officialdom and the kind of repressive 
security measures which seem have become a common-place feature of 




Power is inescapable in organizations. It is literally everywhere. As the 
management and organization science literature reviewed in this paper attests, power 
is such a fundamental part of organizational life that without it they would be unable 
to function. However, except in the case of direct force and violence, power is not 
something that is easily identifiable (as we might do a table or the moon). Especially 
in the case of systemic power relations, its presence and effects must often be inferred 
from the social processes and forms we study in and around organizations. Perhaps it 
this ubiquitous and frequently ‘immaterial’ nature of power that has given rise to such 
a varied and rich research domain. Our paper has sought to map these different 
conceptual approaches with the aforementioned framework in order to clarify how the 
topic has been approached and how it might still yield future surprises for 
management researchers.  
While it is widely recognized that power is a central part of organizations, 
there is no doubt that it still has rather negative connotations, something that is 
perhaps derived from popular perceptions about its nature and effects of power. This 
might explain the rather ‘functionalist’ bias that still characterizes management 
studies more broadly. The rationale goes like this: if we are able to identify the 
functionally necessary elements of power, then we may be able to curb its more 
irrational outcomes with better management models. Based upon our review, 
however, this assumption misses the way power is linked to politics, in which 
different interests and goals are central to its enactment. What is deemed functional to 
top management, for example, might be considered ‘irrational’ to low-level workers 
(and vice versa). Additionally, as we noted in the review and the discussion, power 
might actually be useful for serving socially progressive ends, as the social 
movements literature attests. It not only represses and controls, but also produces 
behavior both desirable and undesirable, depending on the political lens through 
which one views it.  
As with any analytical concept, the swiftly changing world of organizational 
life requires theories of power that are up-to-date and current with the emerging 
trends shaping business and society today. We predict that the shifting nature of 
economic life currently defining large swathes of society will lead researchers to 
focus not so much on organizations per se but financialization. The most powerful 
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actors in economy and society emerging presently are complex and difficult to 
identify hedge-fund institutions (sometimes call ‘shadow banking’), of which 
organizational researchers are only now turning their attention to. The increasing 
concentration of financial wealth in these complicated networks will provide new 
challenges for students of power, especially as they outstrip other institutions in 
shaping the future to come.            
This brings us to our final observation. At the present juncture, we suggest, 
power is now an extremely pertinent topic of discussion given the massive amount of 
popular debate currently unfolding regarding the legitimacy of private corporations, 
state surveillance and ‘shareholder capitalism’ in the US, Europe and elsewhere. The 
recent ‘Occupy Movement’, for example, has raised serious legitimacy concerns 
about many of the organizations we study in management science. We hope that this 
paper offers a useful framework for researchers who have been prompted by these 
wider political events to revisit the concept of organizational power. As we have 
noted, although power has been researched extensively in management studies, there 
is still much to do.         
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